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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
BRUCE TIEGS, individually and as co- 
personal representative of the Estate of 
Kenneth Tiegs; STEWN TIEGS; and 
SUSAN KUTER, individually and as co- 
personal representative of the Estate of 




DUSTIN M. KUKLA; and DAEUELL L. 
ROBERTSON, 
Defendants. 
1 CASE NO. CV 04-4001 
1 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS 
) IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 








AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
: SS 
County of Ada ) 
ERICA S. PHILLIPS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I m one of the attorneys for the PlaintiRs in the above-entitled matter and 
make this Afidavit for and on behalf of said Plaintiffs. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference is 
a true and correct copy of Defendant Michael Kukla's Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs' First 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference 
are true and correct copies of the letters received from Shane Beus of Beus Dairy, Edward 
Vangrouw of Vangrouw Dairy and Jim Slegers of Sundance Dairy in response to the Subpoenas 
served on them in this matter. 
4. I recall speaking with one of the dairy owners whom I believe was John 
Toledo. 
5. During this conversation, Mr. Toledo informed me that he had not 
purchased any straw from any of the parties listed in the subpoena. 
6 .  I requested confmation of this in writing; however it does not appear that 
Mr. Toledo ever provided such a letter to Plaintiffs. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by this reference is 
a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the transcript of the deposition of Darrell 
Robertson t&en on March 1 1,2005. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this reference is 
a true and correct copy of relevant portions of the transcript of the deposition of Dustin Kukla 
taken on April 26,2005. 
FURTHER YOUR MFLANT SAYEW NAUGHT. 
57 
l ( k - ~ c *  -5 plcttp:kL4 
Erica S. Phillips 
I$ SUBSCRIBED AM) SWORN to before me this 22 day of February, 2006. 
MY commission expires: 41 (& 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
CERTEFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT OF EMCA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
S Y JUDGMENT was served upon the following: 
Rodney R. S a e t m  
David W. Lloyd 
SMTRUM LAW OFFICES 
300 E. Mallad Drive, Suite 370 
Boise, ID 83706 
Mailed 
/ Faxed 
V' Hand Delivered 
J. Nick Craw;Ebrd 
BRASSEY W m E L L  GRAWORD 
& GARRETT 
203 W. Main Street - ~ E i i e l i v e r e d  
Boise, ID 83702 
this 3'' day of February, 2006. 
* .  
/!lL&&,, 
Erica S, Phillips 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERICA S. PHILLIPS IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
EXHIBIT "A" 
J. Nick Crawford, ESB No. 3220 
Jolm M. Howell, ISB No. 6234 
BMSSEY, W T m R E L L ,  CMWE;Om & G TT 
203 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1 - 1009 
Telephone: (208) 344-7300 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7077 
Attorneys for Defendant Mike Kukla 
IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICXAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
BRUCE TIECS, individually and as co- 
personal representative of the Estate of 
Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIECS; and 
SUSAN HUTER, individually and as co- 
personal representative of the Estate of 




DUSTIN M. K W A ;  DARRELL L, 
ROBERTSON; and MICHAEL D. 
KUKLA 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 04-400 1 
DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
mQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUNZENTS 
COMES NOW, Michael Kukla, Defendant above named, by and through counsel of record, 
Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
supplemental his responses to Plaintiffs' First interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents propounded herein as follows: 
DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANS WE% TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 1 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the full name, address, employer, title, and position of 
each person who has knowledge of  the facts of said occurrences or of the injuries and damages 
following Iherefiom and the substance of each person's knowledge. 
SUPPLEMENT& ANSVVER TO INTEmOGATORY NO. 1: 
9. Nate Pancheri: Mr. Pancheri has information related to liability. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please provide copies of any and all W-2 forms, 
payroll documents, or other documents that specifically identifj: by name and amounts paid, the 
amounts set forth as deductions for labor expenses of any kind on your 2003 tax returns. 
SUPPLEMENTm RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Attached, 
please find an itemized accounting of all payments made by Kukla Farming to its employees in 2003. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please provide any and ail profit and loss 
statements prepared for your farming operations in the year 2003 which identify amounts paid for 
labor expenses. 
SUPPLEMENTU RESPONSE TO REQUEST FORPRODUCTION NO. 4: Attached, 
please find an itemized accounting of all payments made by Kukla Farming to its employees in 2003. 
DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - 2 
+L 
DATED this 2day of February, 2006. 
t meys for Defendant Mke Kukla v 
CERTImCATE OF SERVICE 
r l 
I HEMBY CERTIFY that on this day of February, 2006, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
PLAXNTIFFS' FIRST INTEIIROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS upon each of the following individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the 
method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Eric S. Rossmm 
Erica S. Phillips 
ROSSMAN, LAW GROUP, PLLC 
737 N. 7th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Terrence R. White 
W I T E  PETERSON 
5700 East Franklin Rd., Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Rodney R. S a e t m ~  
David W. Lloyd 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
300 E. Mallard Drive, Suite 370 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
A S ,  Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
- Facsimile (208) 342-2 170 
/ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 466-4405 
/ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 336-0448 
DEFENDANT MICHAEL KUKLA'S SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORLES 
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Transaction Detail 5 y  Account 
January &rough December 2003 
Num - ..- 
AriZmerrdi, Robem A 
&mendi, ~oborto A. 
Ayala, Udal S. 
sotolo, Jslm A 
Aflzmctndl, Roberto A. 
Ayala, UtW 5. 
Sotelo, Jaime A 
A y a l ,  Ascenlon S. 
Arismandl, Angel A. 
ArizmOnUi, ~ o b t r t o  A. 
Ayala. AscettiOn S 
Ayah, Ascenlon S. 
Ayala, Uriel S 
Sotelo, Jatme 9 
Ayeb, Marc0 $. 
Merndes, Marcas 
Solalo, Jaime A 
Mendaa, Marcds 
Sotelo. Jaime A 
Ayela, Matco S. 
Ayala, Marco S. 
Mendes. Marcos 
Sotelo, Jaime A 
Ayala S., Jorge A 
Ayala, Marco S 
Ayela, Marw S. 
Mendes. Marc03 
Sotelo, Jaime A 
Ayala S.. Jorge A. 
Ayala, Marc0 S 
Mendes, Marcos 
Solelo, Jaime A 
Ayala S., Jorge A. 
Ayala, Marco S. 
Mendes, Marcos 
Sotelo, Ja~me A 
Ayala S., Jorge A 
Guadarama, Ram~m 
Solelo, Jaime A 
Ayale S , Jorge A. 
Guadarama, Ramrro 
Sotelo, Jaime A 
Ayala 3 . Jorge A 
Guadareme, Ramiro 
Sotelo, Jarme A 
Sotelc, Jaime A 
Guadarama, Ramiro 
Ayala 9 , Jorge A. 
Guadafarna, Ramiro 
Ayale S , Jorge A 





To Whom i t  May Concern, 
I, Shane Beus, have never pur .hi led hay or straw from Dustin Kukla, Michael 
KuMa, Damell Robertson or 1 laf i Pancheri. 
Shane Beus 
1580 W. Kuna Cave Rd. 
Kuna, Idaho 83634 
208 922 5968 
Van Grouw Dairy 
Ed and Anne Van Grouw 
19855 S. Cloverdale Rd 
Kuna, Idaho 83634 
Date: i a- 22 - OA- 
Time: 3:03 Py 
From: Van Grouw Dairy 
Fax# 208-362-9793 
Phone: 208-362-41 34 
Total # of Pages I - 
PAGE 01 
Cs. . I I 
EXHIBIT "C" 
I 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON I 
BRUCE TIEGS, individually and as 
) co-personal representative of the ) Case No. CV 04-4001 
Estate of Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN ) TIEGS; and SUSAN HUNTER, 
) individually and as co-personal ) 
representative of the Estate of ) 
Kenneth Tiegs; and K.P. Inc., an ) 
Idaho corporation, ) 
/ vs. 
I DUSTIN M. KUKLA; and DARRELL L. 
j 





-------- ----------- -------------- ) 
DEPOSITION OF DARRELL L. ROBERTSON 
March 11, 2005 
Boise, Idaho 
Reported By: 
Amy Menlove, CSR No. 685, RPR, CRR 
COPY 
1618 W Jefferson r Boise Idaho r 83702 
(800) 588-3370 r (208) 343-4004 v (208) 343-4002 Fax 
000381 I 
Darrell Robertson March I I ,  2005 Tiegs v. Kulda 
4 (Pages 16 to 19) 
1 Nlr. Kukla? 1 Q. Is that in Kuna? 
2 A. Yes, 
4 people every day at the coffee shop, 4 A. 1 live there. I drove by it evay  day. 
5 Q. Okay, And when you say you saw him every 5 Q. You lived in the area? 
6 day, that would have been at the Super C coffee shop? 6 A. I don't know where he lived, but I knew where 
7 A. He just come in and sat down at a near table 7 his fann was. 
8 Q. I guess the question I'm asking is how did 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
208-343-4004 
12 Mr. KuMa's history in any way? 
13 A. Absolutely not. 
14 Q. Did you know of his criminal history? 
15 A. Absolutely not. 
16 Q. Did you know of any of his driving record? 
17 A. Absolutely not. 
18 Q. Did you know of his farming history? 
19 A. His father's history, but not his. 
20 Q. Okay. Did you know of his farming practices? 
2 1 A. Absolutely not. 
22 Q. Did you know if he was a good f m e r  or bad 
23 farmer? 
24 A. I assumed good because his father was good. 
25 Q. Okay. But you didn't know with regard to 
Page 17 
1 Dustin KuMa? 
2 A. Well, I assumed that he followed in his dad's 
3 footsteps as far as his talents in farming. 
4 Q. And that assumption was based upon your 
5 knowledge of Mike KuMa? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Was there anything from your discussions with 
8 Dustin KuMa between April and July of 2003 that gave 
9 you any indication as to his farming practices? 
10 A. Not by talking to him. 
1 1 Q. Okay. From any other -- in any other manner? 
12 A. Driving by his farm, it's simple to see. 
13 Q. Driving by whose farm? 
14 A. His farm. 
15 Q. Dustin's farm? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Do you know if that was Dustin's farm or his 
18 father's farm? 
19 A. Dustin's farm. 
20 Q. Do you know where that was located? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Where? 
23 A. Hubbard Road. 
24 Q. What city is that? 
25 A. It was a rented farm. 
1 1 A. Because he was doing the work. 
12 Q. Okay. Do you know whether his father had 
13 s i ~ e d  the lease or had any interest in the property or 
14 the farming operation? 
15 A. I knew nothing of their business. 
16 Q. From driving by this farm on Hubbard Road, 
17 what type of crop was being grown? 
18 A. Sugar beets. 
19 Q. And from driving by and observing Mr. Kukla, 
20 his farm, did you develop an understanding as to his 
2 1 farming practices, habits? 
22 A. Your opinion changed. 
23 Q. What do you mean by that? 
24 A. Well, it wasn't as shiny as you'd assumed it 
25 would have been. 
Page 19 
1 Q. Well, what about it told you it wasn't as 
2 shiny as you would have assumed it should have been? 
3 A. Weeds, didn't look good. 
4 Q. When was that that you drove by and observed 
5 that? 
6 A. Every day. 
7 Q. This whole time period? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. That was between April and July of '03? 
10 A. But I didn't know if it was because he was 
1 1 out of money and he couldn't afford to have this done or 
12 if it was just character. He never put on like it was 
13 his character. I just assumed he was out of money. 
14 Q. Okay. Did you communicate with him about any 
15 problems that he might be having in farming that 
16 operation? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Was there anything else from your discussions 
19 with Dustin and your observations between April and July 
20 of 2003 that gave you an indication as to his farming 
2 1 practices? 
22 A. Startover. 
23 Q. Was there anything else from your discussions 
24 or observations between April and July of '03 that gave 
25 you any indication about Mr. KuMa's farming practices? 
1 i .  
Dane11 Robertson Ticgs v. Kdda 
9 (Pages 36 to 39) 
1 circle them. 
2 Q. I'll show you the color picture. 
Does that refresh your recollection at all? 
4 Q. Bottom right corner -- 4 A. I can't remember if them are reflectors up 
9 that these exhibits are black and white, do you 9 ones, those you know are reflectors? 
10 recopize that as your baler? 10 A. 1 know these are too. 
11 A. I don't recognize the baler yet, but I 11 Q. All right. 
12 recognize the tractor attached to it. 12 A. But maybe that one is too. 
13 MR. LLOYD: Okay. Testify accordingly. 13 Q. And do you know how long -- had those 
14 THE W m S S :  The tires. 14 reflectors been located on that baler and the trailer to 
16 or-- 16 the equipment? 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
208-343-4004 
000383 
17 A. Yes. 
I8 Q. Are there my differences in appearance 
19 between the baler that you owned that we've been talking 
20 about in this deposition and the baler that you can see 
2 1 in those photographs? 
22 A. Looks the same. 
23 Q. If you look at the third page in, page 0056, 
24 bottom right comer -- 
25 A. Yes. 
Page 37 
1 Q. Can you take my pen and circle for me every 
2 reflector that is located on that baler, to your 
3 knowledge? 
4 A. I don't know if the bottom one or the top one 
5 is -- I think it's the top one, isn't it? I can't tell 
6 by these pictures. Oh, there they are. 
7 h4R. ROSSMAN: Let's go off the record. 
8 (Discussion held off the record.) 
9 Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) So you're looking at a 
10 color photograph that is the same photograph that we saw 
1 1 on page 56 of Exhibit 2; is that correct? 
12 A. There is -- also our -- they're the lower 
13 ones. And I don't know, is this top one a reflector 
14 too? 
15 Q. I'm just asking your recollection, not your 
16 lawyer's. I just want to know from you. 
17 Do you recall all of the reflectors that are 
18 located on the back of that baler? 
19 A. Well, there was four. 
20 Q. Okay. So we see two at the bottom, page 56, 
21 bottom? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. And then you see two more on the cab, but 
24 you're not sure where exactly there? 
25 A. I could go home and look and come back and 
17 A. Well, if they're there now, they were there 
18 when I bought it. 
19 Q. Did you ever replace or modi& those 
20 reflectors in any way after you bought the equipment? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Did you ever repair the reflectors in any way 
23 after you bought the equipment? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. From your experience in farming practices, is 
Page 39 
1 hay baling typically performed in the evening hours 
2 after sunset? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. What is the reason for that? 
5 A. Get the light off of it and just toughens it 
6 up so everything doesn't shatter and fall apart. 
7 Q. I want to talk to you about when Dustin KuMa 
8 came to you about July 24th or 25th of 2003. 
9 Did he borrow the tractor and the baler that 
10 we've been talking about in this deposition? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Tell me everything you recall about that 
13 particular discussion you had with Dustin. 
14 k He had bought some straw from Shroll and his 
15 grandpa's baler wasn't running. He was going to use his 
16 grandpa's baler. And Shrolls were giving him trouble 
17 about getting that one field off. 
18 And I says, "Well, go see your grandpa and 
19 see if he's going to have that one running." 
20 And then he come back and said he didn't. 
21 I said, "Well, I'm using mine." 
22 He goes, "Well, that's not a problem. I'll 
23 go finish yours." 
24 And so that day was hazy, so we could bale 
25 during the day on the straw. And he finished baling 
March 1 1,2005 Tiegs v. Kukla 
12 (Pages 48 to 51) 
1 A. It was on it. 
2 Q. And, in fact, he borrowed it about four to 2 Q. Okay. Wow long did this conversation with 
3 Dustin KuMa last? 
4 A. Minute. 
5 Q. Did you give him any instructions during rhe 
7 or transportation of the baler? 7 A. No. 
8 A. No. The conversation didn't go that far. It 8 Q. Now, you testified that your practice has 
9 was just a matter of borrowing it. 9 been with that baler that you don't trmsport it at 
10 Q. So you said, "Go ahead and borrow it"? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. What did you say? 12 Q. You were concerned about transporting it at 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
208-343-4004 
13 A. I said, "If your grandpa's baler is not 
14 fixed, then we'll talk about it." 
15 Q. And he indicated that his grandpa's baler 
16 wasn't fixed? 
17 A. Right, on the phone. 
18 Q. And then you said, "I'm using it. I've got 
19 hay I need to bale"? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Where was that hay? 
22 A. On Kuna-Meridian Highway. 
23 Q. Where on Kuna-Meridian Highway? 
24 A. South of Deer Flat on Kuna-Meridian Highway, 
25 quarter of a mile. 
Page 49 
1 Q. How far is that from the Shroll property? 
2 A. Must be eight miles. That's just a guess. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. And that was a straight shot. It wasn't like 
5 we had to weave through the countryside. 
6 Q. Straight shot on the Kuna-Meridian Highway? 
7 A. On Kuna-Meridian Road, pretty much straight. 
8 Couple turns, but that's it. 
9 Q. And he borrowed your tractor as well? 
10 A. Yes. You just don't swap from tractor to 
11  tractor. 
12 Q. So the tractor was already connected to the 
13 baler, you said just borrow the whole thing. 
14 A. That's assumable when you take a baler. 
15 Q. All right. And the trailer portion at the 
16 back of the baler, is that part of the baler or is that 
17 a separate component? 
18 A. It's an add-on called an accumulator. 
19 Q. Did the accumulator ever have any lighting 
20 sources other than the two reflectors? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. And did you buy the accumulator at the time 
23 that you bought the baler? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Did you have it added on or was it already -- 
13 night because of it's lack of lighting; correct? 
14 A, Yes. 
15 Q. Did you understand what the legal 
16 requkaents  were for transporting a baler such as that 
17 at night? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. What was your understanding at the time? 
20 A. Need lights. 
2 1 Q. Need lights from the front and the rear; 
22 correct? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And the reason -- did you have an 
25 understanding as to how much the baler and the tractor 
Page 5 1 
1 together weighed at that point in time? 
2 A. No idea. 
3 Q. Did you wlcferstand that it weighed tens of 
4 thousands of pounds'? 
5 A. M e r  we weighed it I knew what it weighed. 
6 Q. Before that did you have an understanding or 
7 belief? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. You understood it was very heavy equipment; 
10 correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And if something impacted into that 
13 equipment, it could cause very serious damage? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Did you have an understanding as to what the 
16 maximum speed was for that tractor pulling that baler? 
17 A. I knew what it was. 
18 Q. What was it? 
19 A. 18. 
20 Q. 18 miles per hour? 
21 A. On the computer it's 18. I don't know what 
22 the actual speed is. I don't have a radar. 
23 Q. When you say "computer," what do you -- 
24 A. Tractor computer. 
25 Q. Inside the tractor has a computer. 
"* 
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1 A. Yes. 1 A. It. falls under common sense. 
2 Q. And it has a speedometer? 2 Q. In your mind, it falls under common sense 
3 A. It has WMs. 3 that he wouldn't do k t ?  
5 A. 18. It would go up to 19 if you were going 5 Q. Do you know whether Dustin Kukla knew about 
6 down the hill. 6 whether or not the lighting sources on the baler were 
7 working the night of July 30th, 2003? 
8 A. Weknew. 
9 A. Yes. 9 Q. How do you know that? 
10 Q. And so the maximum speed would be 19 if you 10 A. Because he was running it after dark. 
1 1 were going down a hill? 1 1 Q. And if he's running it after dark, how would 
12 A. Yes. 12 he know whether or not the lighting on the back of the 
13 (Pages 52 to 55) 
13 Q. Okay. Now, you testified earlier that you 
14 understood that transporting that baler with that 
15 tractor in the middle of the night with the lighting 
16 conditions on that baler would be extremely dangerous; 
17 is that correct? 
18 A. You don't do it. 
19 MR. LLOYD: Objection. I think that misstates his 
20 testimony. 
21 You can answer if you can. 
22 Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Would you have considered 
23 that to be extremely dangerous? 
24 A. Yes. You don't do it. 
25 Q. Did you have any conversation with Dustin 
13 baler was operational? 
14 A. Because, see, in the middle of the night when 
15 you're baling straw, you'll be up and down this ladder 
16 about every ten bales to reset the knotters. We have a 
17 flashlight inside the cab. You crawl up there, you pull 
18 it down, stick it in your mouth, run it down the chamber 
19 and go back to baling. And if he baled any at all, he 
20 knew. He crawled up that ladder to fix it. 
21 Q. Did you talk to Dustin at any time to find 
22 out whether or not he'd been around behind the back of 
23 thebaler? 
24 A. I knew he had. 
25 Q. How did you know that? 
Page 53 
1 KuMa about transporting that baler at night? 
2 A . N o .  
3 Q. Did you have any conversation with Dustin 
4 KuMa about the lighting on that baler? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you at any time tell Dustin KuMa, "You 
7 can take it but don't transport it at night"? 
8 A . N o .  
9 Q. There are farmers with proper lighting on 
10 bailers that will transport bailers at night; correct? 
1 1 A. Yes, but over the years they've made comments 
12 about how uncomfortable that is. 
13 Q. Had you ever had a conversation with Dustin 
14 KuMa about the safety of transporting a baler at night? 
15 A. No. But we don't even move tractors at night 
16 to speak of. 
17 Q. Do you know whether or not Dustin KuMa moved 
18 tractors at night at that point in time? 
19 A. No, never seen it. 
20 Q. You didn't know what his habits and practices 
21 were as far as transporting farm equipment at that point 
22 in time; correct? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. And you made no inquiry with anyone to find 
25 out before you loaned him the equipment; correct? 
Page 55 
1 A. Because you do not bale without having to 
2 deal with that. 
3 Q. Let me ask you, do you know whether or not 
4 Dustin had been back to the back of that baler the night 
5 of July 30th, 2003? 
6 A. I never physically saw him, but you do not do 
7 it without having to walk around checking needles and -- 
8 Q. Okay. And you understood that there is a 
9 counter in the baler that shows how many bales had been 
10 baled by Dustin since he borrowed it; right? 
1 1 A. It's inside the cab on the computer. 
12 Q. And you understood that he'd baled about 1 15 
13 bales; correct? 
14 A. Surprised me, yes. 
15 Q. That's a pretty low figure? 
16 A. Very low. 
17 Q. You expected that there would have been a lot 
18 more bales than that? 
19 A. If I'd have borrowed a baler because I was in 
20 trouble I'd have been on that baler -- I'd have lived on 
21 that baler. 
22 Q. Do you know how many of those bales were 
23 baled at night? 
24 A. No. 
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25 (Pages 100 to 103) 
1 transportation of the baler? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Did he tell you when you could and couldn't 
4 Q. How many miles did you need to travel on 4 transporl the baler? 
5 M c D m o t t  to get to the Shroll p r o p m ?  5 A. No. 
6 A. Probably two, three miles. 6 Q. Did he ask you if you'd had any experience 
7 Q. Okay. And what is the speed limit on that 7 baling properties, baling straw? 
8 A. Not that I can r m m k  him ever asking me. 
9 A. It's 50. 9 Q. Did he ask you if you knew when it was 
10 Q. And what is the terrain? 10 best -- when was the best time to transport a 20,000 
I I A. McDemott has a little bit of a hill to it. 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
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IS A. Yes, because he folIowed me over there and 
16 gave me a ride back to Kuna to get my pickup. 
17 Q. Okay. Did Mr. Robertson ask you if you were 
18 going to be taking it anywhere else, the baler? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Did he ask you if you were going to be 
21 f m i n g  or baling any other properties? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did he ask you if anybody else was going to 
24 be helping you? 
25 A. No. 
Page 101 
1 Q. Did he give you any instructions on the use 
2 of the baler? 
3 A . N o .  
4 Q. Did he tell you that there were any defects 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Did he tell you it would be unsafe to 
17 t ranspo~ that at night? 
18 A. No, because balers are moved at night because 
19 you could bale hay at night. 
20 Q. And when you do move them at night, you 
21 understand that there is a requirement that there be 
22 proper lighting and reflectors at the back of the baler? 
23 A. Yes, I do. 
24 Q. Because it's extremely dangerous, you 
25 understand, to have a baler that size going that speed 
Page 103 
1 on a 50-mile-an-hour highway without proper lighting 
2 behind it? 
3 A. It needs proper lighting. 
4 Q. Okay. It's fair to say when you borrowed 
5 in the baler? 
6 A . N o .  
7 Q. Did he tell you the lights weren't working on 
8 the baler? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Did he tell you the reflectors were not up to 
1 1 date on the baler? 
12 A. No. 
13 MR. LLOYD: Objection. I'm just objecting to the 
14 form of the question. 
15 Go ahead and answer. 
16 Q. (BY MR. ROSSMAN) Did he tell you that the 
17 lights at the rear of the baler were not working? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. You could see at the rear of this baler that 
20 there were lights, correct? 
21 A. There is lights on it, yes. 
22 Q. But he didn't tell you that those lights 
23 weren't working, correct? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Okay. Did he give you any instructions on 
5 this baler from Mr. Robertson, you understood or 
6 believed that it had proper lighting? 
7 A. I didn't know what it had. 
8 Q. Didyouaskhim? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Did he tell you? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Did he say to you, "Don't transport this at 
13 night"? 
14 A. No, he didn't. 
15 Q. Did he say to you, "Always have a tail 
16 vehicle when you transport this"? 
17 A. No. I'd moved equipment before and we've 
18 never used tail vehicles ever, during the day or 
19 nothing. 
20 Q. I understand your experience, but did he ask 
2 1 you about what your experience was in moving equipment? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did he ask you whether or not you ever used a 
24 tail vehicle when you moved equipment? 
25 A. No. 
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29 (Pages 116 to 119) 
1 out. Is it one parcel? 
2 A. Parcel as -- 2 A. Highway 45. 
5 A. Aparcel as what? 5 A. Like I say, one might be 300 feet, one might 
6 be a half a mile. The Earthest- one I think was about a 
7 mile, maybe, half a mile. 
8 Q. Okay. So is it fair to say that ail these 
9 fields that you were going to be baling extended over a 
10 Q. That's all I'm trying to find out. t 0 distance of about a mile? 
I 1 A. They're scattered all - they farm a lot of 1 1 A. Well, one way a mile. Then the other way 
12 ground. They're scattered. That's all f m i n g  is, it's 12 they farmed a lot of ground down Missouri. They farm 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
208-343-4004 
000391 
14 Q. I understand. And that's all I want to know. 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q, You say they farm a lot of ground. You're 
17 talking about the Shrolls? 
18 A. Yeah, Norm and Russ farm a lot of ground. 
19 Q. So there is a 20-acre piece that they had, 
20 approximately? 
2 1 A. Yeah, probably had 20 acres. 
22 Q, And it had straw on it? 
23 A. Uh-huh. 
24 Q. Is that a yes? 
25 A. Yes. 
Page 1 17 
1 Q. And is that the field that you went to with 
2 Mr. Robertson when he followed you in driving the baler? 
3 A. Yes, 
4 Q. Wow many of these fields were in straw at 
5 that time? 
6 A. They had eight, nine, ten fields of straw, 
7 maybe 12. 
8 Q. And Darrell knew that, correct? 
9 A. Yeah, I think so. 
10 Q. He could see that there -- 
1 1 A. He could see all Shrolls' farm here. And 
12 there is one there, one there, one there, one there. 
13 Q. Did he know what fields were Shroll property, 
14 were owned by the Shrolls? 
15 A. He probably had a good idea. I don't know. 
16 Q. But is it fair to say from your understanding 
17 of your discussions with Mr. Robertson that he was aware 
18 that you weren't going to be just baling one field? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. And in baling other fields, is it fair 
21 to say that he understood that you would have to 
22 transport the baler to another field? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. And what road would you have had to use to 
25 transport the baler in order to get from one field to 
13 probably three or four miles down Missouri. 
14 Q. And it was anticipated that you were going to 
15 bale that property too? 
16 A. Everything that Sbrolls had I was baling. 
17 Q. Okay. And what's the speed limit on 
18 Missouri? 
19 A. It's 50 miles an hour. 
20 Q. What's the terrain on Missouri? 
21 A, It's not flat, but it's got a little dip to 
22 it. 
23 Q. And the speed limit on Highway 45 during this 
24 one mile stretch is? 
25 A. 65. 
Page 1 19 
1 Q. And how would you describe the terrain? 
2 A. Terrain from where we started baling to where 
3 the other field was? 
4 Q. Yeah, the mile stretch. 
5 A, It's not flat, but it's got a little dip like 
6 this to it when you come into it. From the subdivision 
7 to Missouri, it's got a little tiny -- it's not flat, 
8 but -- 
9 Q. When you say "from the subdivision," what are 
10 you talking about? 
1 I A. Rolling Hills. 
12 Q. And at the top of Missouri, is it fair to say 
13 that that's kind of an apex of a hill, the top of a 
14 hill? 
15 A. I don't understand what an apex is. 
16 Q. Top. 
17 A. Yeah, it's kind of a little top. 
18 Q. So there could be cars on the other side of 
19 Missouri that probably can't see the bottom of this 
20 valley, I think as you described it, or the lowest point 
2 1 of this stretch after -- between the Missouri and the 
22 subdivision? 
23 A. The lowest point, I wasn't to the lowest 
24 point yet. 
25 Q. Just tell me if a car is located or your 
April 26,2005 Tiegs, et al. v. Kukla, et al. 
3 1 (Pages 124 to 127) 
1 A. I'm not sure what was working and what 1 there, and broke a shear pin. As I explained, the shear 
2 wasn't. I never really got out and really went through 2 pin is on the fly wheel. The PTQ comes out of the 
3 things and looked at it. I never had to. This was a 3 tractor, comes up, and that's what rum the baler, makes 
4 good baler. It ran good and e v m i n g  else, I just 4 the guts of it work. There is a big fly wheel and it 
5 broke a shear pin. I ran out of shear pins. Shear pins 5 has a deal on there that has a pin and it breaks it to 
6 are on the front of the tractor where the PTO hooks to 6 keep evewhing else from bre&g. 
7 the tractor. I never got up and climbed on it or I'd already used my last one earlier. So I 
8 nothing. I was going to run down and get a shear pin. 8 broke another one, I just had this little bit left to go 
9 Q. Before the evening of July 30th, had you been 9 in this field, and I just wanted to get done. And I 
10 baling with that baler at night any other time? 10 thought I could move down to another one and get some of 
11 A, Not at night, just until dusk. 1 1 that done, you know. So I went, took the tractor out of 
12 the field down the road to my pickup to go get a shear 
Associated Reporting, Inc. 
13 A. Until I couldn't see any more, then I shut 
14 the tractor off. 
15 Q. So this was the first night that you had been 
16 baling? 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. And during that period of time at night on 
19 July 30th, was there ever an occasion for you to have to 
20 walk around behind the baler? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Was there ever an occasion at which you can 
23 recall observing that the lights at the back of the 
24 baler were not functioning? 
25 A. I never had actually used it at night and had 
Page 125 
I actually crawled around it and seen if it works. 
2 Because all the lighting on it would have been in the 
3 back of it. There is nothing in the front to indicate 
4 to me that there is any lights or anything going. 
5 Q, That's fine, I understand that. So I guess 
6 if you can just try to give me a yes or no. 
7 Do you recall as you sit here today prior to 
8 the accident ever recognizing that the lights were not 
9 hc t ioning  on the back of the baler? 
10 A. No, sir. 
1 1 Q. Okay. And there was no occasion for you to 
12 go around behind the baler to actually see whether or 
13 not those lights were functioning, correct? 
14 A. Correct. 
15 Q. You knew the baler had lights -- 
16 A, Yes. 
17 Q. There was no occasion for you to look to see 
18 if they were working? 
19 A. Uh-huh. 
20 Q. Is that a yes? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Tell me what happened at the time that caused 
23 you to stop baling and transport the baler onto Highway 
24 45. 
25 A. I had used my last shear pin, put it in 
14 Q. Okay. What field were you farmkg before the 
15 accident? 
16 A, Shroll lives right on the corner of Missouri 
17 and Highway 45. 
I8 Q. I'm going to give you a piece of paper, maybe 
19 you can roughly draw out this piece of property in 
20 relation to Highway 45. 
2 1 A. Sure, 1'11 do that. 
22 Here's Highway 45. Here's the house, the 
23 field lays like this. Here's where I come out on the 
24 road, down the road. 
25 Q. Okay. So this would be south? 
Page 127 
1 A. Uh-huh. 
2 Q. This would be north? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. East, west. 
5 A . Y e s .  
6 Q. Okay. And this is the field that you were 
7 baling? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And we'll call that -- I'll just put a " 1 " in 
10 the middle of that. 
11 That's the field you were baling? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. How many acres is that? 
14 A. I think it's like five acres. Maybe, five, 
15 six, seven acres. 
16 Q. All of it was straw? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And how much of that five to seven acres had 
19 you baled? 
20 A. Almost all the long rows I had left there to 
21 do. 
22 Q. Okay. And where was your pickup located? 
23 A. Down here. 
24 Q. Where? 
25 A. There's another field down here that my . 
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DUSTIN M. KIKLA; DARRELL L. 
ROBERTSON; and MICHAEL D. 
KUIUA 
Defendants. I 
Case No. CV 04-400 1 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PmJUDICE 
The Stipulation filed contemporaneously herein between the Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Michael D. Kukla, having been presented to the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises; 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE - 1 
000394 
1T IS HEREBY OmERED, ADJUDGED AND DECWED that P la in t i f f skended  
Complaint against Defendant Michael D. Kukla on file herein be, and the same hereby is, dismissed 
with prejudice, each party to bear his or her awn costs asxi attorney fees. 
DATED t16s day of 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREPJDICE - 2 
000395 
CLEW" SGERTIFIGATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of March, 2006, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE upon each of the following 
individuals by causing the same to be delivered by the method and to the addresses indicated below: 
Eric S. Rossman 1 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Erica S. Phillips Hand-Delivered 
ROSSMAN, LAW GROUP, PLLC Overnight Mail 
737 N. 7th Street Facsimile (208) 342-21 70 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Terrence R. White 2 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
WHITE PETERSON Eland-Delivered 
5700 East Fra~lklin Rd., Suite 200 Overnight Mail 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 Facsimile (208) 466-4405 
Rodney R. S a e t m  U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
David W. Lloyd - Wand-Delivered 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES Overnight Mail 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite1800 Facsimile (208) 336-0448 
Boise, Idaho 83702-5958 
J. Nick Grawford _Ih U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
John M. Howell Wand-Delivered 
Brassey, Wetherell, Crawford & Garrett Overnight Mail 
203 West Main Street Facsimile (208) 344-7077 
P.O. Box 1009 
Boise, Idaho 83701- 2009 
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Erie S. Rossmm, ISB #4573 
Erica S. Phillips, ISB #6009 
R O S S M  LAW GROW, PLLC 
737 N. Yth Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 33 1-2030 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2 170 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUW 
Terrence R. White, ISB # 13 5 1 
W T E  PETERSON 
5700 East Franklin Rd, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGrnNT - 1 
Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion for S m q  Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing before this Court on March 8,2006. The Plaintiffs were present by and through their 
counsel of record, Eric S. Rossman of Rossman Law Group, PLLC, and the Defendant Darrell 
Robertson was present by and through his counsel of record, David W. Lloyd of Saetrum Law 
Offices. AAer hearing arguments of counsel, and reviewing the documents and pleadings of 
record, IT IS JXEmBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Darrell 
Robertson's Motion for S m q  Judgment is hereby DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
DATED this day of MP" I ?'GO6 ,2006. 
V 
District Judge 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - 2 
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Eric S. Rossmm, ISB H573 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331 -2030 
Facs~Ie?:  (208) 342-2 2 70 
Attomqs for Plaintiffs 
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, ROSSMAN 
LAW GROUP, PLLC, and hereby submit this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell 
Robe~son's Motion for Sumaxy Judgment. 
aud negligent entrustmat on behalf of Dmell Robatson. On July 29,2005, PlainPiffs filed a 
motion for leave to amend to add Michael Kukla as a defendant in this matter. Following oral 
argument md a hearing, th 
2006, Defendant Darsetl Robwson filed a motion for su 
no evidehce to support 
entmsmmt, md imputed 1 
argument on the motion, thc 
Def'daat has now 
Plaintiffs' claims. Defendant has raised na new issues, but rather reasserts the same arguments 
made in the earlier motion for summary judgment previously denied by the Court. Wbile 
Plaintiffs recognize that without a fmal judgment, the decision denying summary judgment 
remains intalocutory and can be reconsidered by the Court, Plaintiffs would remind the Court 
MEMORWUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEmN]DANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMGRY ;IUDGMIENT - 2 
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that Defmdant raised thcsc same issues prior to trial in this matter aod the Court denied 
Defendant's motian and aljowed Plaintiffs to proced to trial on these claims. But for the 
mistrial declared by the COUI?, Defendant would not have had the opportunity to bring this same 
motion yet again. Nw&elcss, for the reasons set forth below, PlaintifFs respecthlly assert that 
there are genuine issues of  material fact remaining for trial in this matter and, as such, 
Defendant's motion must be denied. 
Falh Highway Disf.. 135 Idaho 322,325,17 P.3d 266,269 (2000). When considering a motion 
for summary judgment, "a court liberally construes the record in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion and draws all. reasonable iderenc 
favor." Id Applying the applicable standard ofreview to the r 
i s  not appropriate as the 
against Defendant Darre 
2. 
As he did in the fnst motion fur sumw judgment, Robertson argues that he is 
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for negligent entrustment because Plaintiffs 
cannot establish that Robertson knew or should have known that Kukla was an incapacitated or 
MEM0RANI)UM EN OPPOSI'I'XON TO DEFENDANT IlrlliRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
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incompetent person who would use the tranor and baler in a mamer that would create an 
unreasonable risk of harm to ot&ers. Howwer, as he has done previously, Robertson misstates 
the staodard for a negligent enhustment claim in Idaho, as well as the facts tspporting Plaintiffs' 
claim. 
In Ransom v. Cify of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1 987), the 
the thing or to canduct himself in the activity in such a ma= as 
to create an unrwonable risk of harm to others, 
Set? id. (mphasis added). 
This is the definitio 
Supreme Court. Nothing 
"The dutv to take mecautions aaainst the neglinence of others thus 
involves merely the usual. process of multiplvinn the ~robab& 
that such nenli~ence will occur bv the magnitude of the harm likely 
to resuft if it does, and weiahina the result against the burden ugon 
the defendant o f  exercisina: such care, The duty arises, in other 
words, only w h m  a reasonable person would recognize the 
existence of an unreasonabIe risk of harm to others through the 
mMORAM,UM IN DPPOS.ITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
POR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
intmentioa of such negligmce. It becomes most obvious wben 
the acwr bas reurn to h o u r  that he: i s  dealing with pemm whase 
chwacteristics make it especially likely that they will do 
umeasombte things. The actor may be required to guard an insane 
patimt to pmvent him h m  jumping &om the hospital window, or 
to refrain b r n  gulting an intoxicated person off of a train into a 
railroad yard, or letting him have an automobile, or more liquor." 
See Ransom, 1 13 Idaho at 206-207,743 P.2d at 75-76 ( q u o ~ g  Presser and Keeton, The Law of 
Torts $33, at 199 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added). The Court then concluded that "[wJhe 
As is set forth cleady above, the Court did not adopt the tort of negligent 
enttustment only in the specific cases of an incompetent or incapacitated petson. Rather, the 
Court adopted the tort and specified the duty arising korn the right ta control a vehicle- that the 
owner exercise reasonable care and not 
knows, or should foreseeably kno 
0tht;rs. 
T h i g  definition of n 
v. Langer, I 14 IW5 873,761, P. 
entrushnenl as "faln owner or other pmon in control of a vehi.cl.e axld respoasible for its use may 
be beld liable for damages resulting &om use of the vehicle by another under the theory of 
negligent entrustment, where such person hav  or should have known that such use may cratc 
an unreasonable risk of ham to others.': See id. at 875,76t P,2d at 1227. 
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Robertson insists that proving that he h e w  that Dustin Kukla was an incompetent 
or incapacitatal person is necessary to proving a claim of  negligent entiustment. However, 
Robaison can cite to no Idaho case law in which the Court has expressly identified that aspect as 
an actual element of a negligent entrustment case. Rather, each case in which the Court 
discussed this element of the tort of negligent mtmsment actually involved a person who was 
intoxicated or othrtnvise incornpet 
has recognized the general duty to not permit another person to we a vehicle where such pason 
knew or should have known that such use may create an mwooabk risk of harm to others. See 
uw68sonablc ris 
tractor and baler, Further, Robertson 
baler in a manner which created an umeasonable n'sk of harm to others. Thus, the only issue 
raised by Robertson in regard to the claim for negligent entntstwr.ent, as defined by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, is whether Robertson knew or should have known that Dustin was likely to use 
the tractor and baler in a m m e r  which created aa unreasonable risk of ham to Kemeth Tiegs. 
m M O W U M  .IN OPPOSITION TO DEmNIDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
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The Idaho COU& h~ held that foreseeability is generally a question for 
the jury. Aie@ia v. Payor&, 101 Idaho 61 7, 619,619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). In his depositioR 
Robeltson testified that he never informed Dustin &Ha that the lights on the baler did not work. 
See Deposition of Darrell Robertson ("Robertson Rqo."), p. 52, line 25 - p. 53, line 8, attached 
as E a b i t  "A" to the m d a v i t  of David W. Lloyd. Robertson also testified that be knew that 
mtom and balers were t 
line 1. Dustin Kukla testified that he wss not aware that the lights were not working on the 
tractor and balm. See Deposition ofDustin KuWa ("Kukla Depo."), p. 124, line 18 -p. 125, line 
21, attached ss Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of David W. Lloyd. Dustin also testified that 
Robertson neva told him 
understanding that the tractor and baler would be used only for the purpose of baling straw on 
the Schroll property. However, Robertson testified that he h e w  that tractors and balers am 
moved at night with proper lighting. See Robertson Depo., p. 53, LL 9-12. Further, Robertson 
testified that he knew that baling activities were typically performed in the evening hours after 
MEMORANDUM W UPPOSlTION TO DEFlENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTTON 
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sunset. See Robertson Depo., p. 38, line 25 - p. 39, line 6. Dustin Kukla testified that Robertson 
h e w  that the Scholl property included several different parcels and that Robenson was aware 
that Dustin would have to transport the tractor and baler from one parcel to another io the course 
of his baling activities. See Kukla Depo., p. 117, LL 16-23. Kukla also testified th& the road 
used to transport the tractor and baler from one field to aoothm was Highway 45. See Kukla 
line 23 - p. 66, line 3. Robertson testified that it was at least 10:00 or 11:00 at night and pitch 
black and that Dustin was baling straw at that time. See Robertson Dcpo., p. 66, tL 4-24. 
knowledge of Kukla's history, dri 
LL 9-21. Rather, Robertson simply assumed Dustin was a good f m e i  because his fatha was. 
See Robertson Depo., p. 16, line 22 - p. 17, line 3. Robertson also testified that he observed 
Kukl,a f d n g  property between April an? July of 2003 and that his opinion of Kukla's f&g 
practices changed because the property didn't look good. See Robertson Depo., p. 18, line 19 - 
MEMOIMNDW IN OlPPOSlTXON TO DEFErU'DANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTIOJY 
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p. 19, line 13. Finally, Robatson testified that he did not know Kukla's farming practices at the 
time he loaned the tractor and baler to Kukla and made no inquiries regarding his habits and 
practices in transyoning farm quipmmt prior to loaning the tractor and baler to Kukla. See 
Robertson Dcpo., p. 53, line 20 - p. 5 4  l i n ~  1.
Based on the evidence provided in this case, tbere are issues of fact regarding 
whether Robertson knew or should have h o r n  that Dustin was likely to use the tractor and bala 
in a manner which. 
know1 edge of balin 
property consisted of several notl-contiguous pa 
Robertson should have known that Dustin would operate the tractor and baler at night and that 
the tractor and baler would be moved on a public road. Further, Roboltson specifically knew fhat 
Dustin was baling the property at night because he had personally observed that activity the day 
prior to the accident. Because Rob 
Dustin to borrow the 
Based on his own testimony, Robertson bad actual knowledge that Dustin was 
operating the traaor and baler on the Scholl property at night. Given this information, as well as 
his knowledge about the non-contiguous parcels, the fact that he knew the lights did not work, 
and that operating the tractor and baler on Highway 45 at night would create ao umasonable 
mM0-m ,IN OPPOSlTION TO DEFENDANT DMUELL ROBERTSONjS MOTION 
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risk of danger to others, Robertson certainly should have at least inquired as to Dustin's practices 
regarding transporting tractor and balm at night and, therefore, most certainly should have 
reasonably known that there was a likelihood that Dustin would transport the tractor and baler 
from one field to anotl~n at night. As such, thae are genuine issues of fact remaining for trial on 
Plaintiffs' claim for negligent enttustrnent and Robertson's motion must be denied. 
2 nere are Genuine issut~s of Fact Remaining Regarding Plointtjlf"g' 
Claim for P Sa, 
this argument, Robertson asserts that there is no evidence that he caused or knowingly permitted 
Dustin to operate the tractor and bailer on a public roadway at night without working tail lights 
because the tractor and bailer were loaned to Dustin and transported to the Scholl property 
during tht: day and that i 
argues that Idaho Code 
of a vehicle in violation o 
this case d~monstrate th 
condition in violation of Idaho Code $4  49-902(1) and 49-91 6. 
Idaho Code @49-9 16 requires that tractors and towed implements of husbandry 
which are operated on fbe public roads between sunset and sunrise have working 1igh.t~ andlor 
reflectors visible from a distance of at least 500 fcet. See id. In this case, it i s  undisputed that 
MEMO-W TN OPIPOSITION TO DEFl3T4'DANT DARJWLL ROBERTSON" MOTION 
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Robertson's tractor and baler did not comply with the requirements of Idaho Code $$49-916. 
Further, it is undisputed that Robertson knew, at the time be loaned the tractor and balcr to 
Dustin Kulda, that the lighting system on the tractor and baler did not work. See Robertson 
Depo,, p. 50, LL 8-23. 
Robeason further tmtified that while he knew that the Idaho law required li&&g 
borrowed the &tor and baler despite the fact that he had no kaa 
about, Dustin's farrtxlia 
that Dustin would be &ansporting the baler at night. However, Robertson testified that tractors 
and balm are moved at night with proper lighting. See Robertson Depo., p. 53, LL 9-12. 
Further, Robet~son testified that he h e w  that baling activities were typically performed in the 
evening hours after sunset. See Robertson Depo., p. 38, line 25 - p. 39, line 6. Dustin Kukla 
mMORAM)UM XN OPPOSWJON TO DEXENDGNT D-LL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR SIJ'MhURY SUT)GmHT - 11 
testified that Robwson knew that the Scholl property in~luded several different parcels and that 
Robertson was aware that Dustin would have to transport the tractor and baler from one parcel to 
mother in the course of his baling activities. See KuMa Depo., p. 117, LL 16-23 Kukla also 
testified that the road used to transport the tractor and balm from one field to aothcr was 
Highway 45. See Kukla Depo., p. 1 17, line 24 - p. 1 18, line 2. Further, Dustin Kukla testified 
l1:W at night and pitch black and that Dustin was baling straw at tbat time. See Robertson 
Dtpo., p. 66, LL 4-24. 
on a public Irlgbway. Further, Ro 
howledge, Robertson never informed Kukla that the taillights on the baler did not work, nor did 
he condition his lending of the baler on any assurance from Dustin that it would not be operated 
on the public highways after sunset. Under such circumstances a jury could reasonably find that 
Robntson did knowingly p m i t  Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on the public highway 
MEMO-UM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT D U L L  ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
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after sunset in an unsafe condition. 
A shp ly  hypothetical demonskata the reasonablenas of such a detsmination. 
Suppose A allows B to borrow A's car. A h w s  that the headlights are not in working order. A 
also knows that B is borrowing the car to go to work. A fkther knows that B sometimes stays at 
work until &r dark. A never tells B that the headlights are not working. B botrows the car, 
works late one night and then finds that the headlights don' 
working headlights and never told B tbat hc could not operate the vehicle aRor dark because of 
the broken headlights. This case is no different. Robertson knew that the lights on the tractor 
and baler did not work and never iofomed Dustitx of that fact, d 
baling activities generally occtrned aad the fact that the baler wou 
public highway to reach the different parcels on the Scholl 
on Plainti@' claim for ne 
Robertson. The claim was asserted in Count One of Plaintiffs' Complaint and is included within 
the claim for negligence per se. Even assuming that Plaintigs cannot estabIish that Idaho Code 
$5 49-902(1) and 49-916 provide a legal duty which was breached by Robatson, Plaintiffs can 
still demonstrate that a legal duty exi.sts in this case aside from the statutory duty, that such duty 
NEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 3'0 DEFEMDANT DARFtELI, ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR S-Y JUDGMENT - 13 
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n <&,*fid* 
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was breached by Robertson, and that such a breach was a pmximate cause of the death of 
Kemeth Tiegs. In fact, despite the Couxtys earlier ruling on s m a r y  judgment, as well as the 
Court's decision allowing Plaintiffs to proceed against Robenson on a claim for negligence, 
Robettson has not even attempted to argue that he is eatitled to sumatyjudpent  on Plaintifi' 
claim for negligence. As such, even if the Court were to grant RobMson's motion with regards 
to &a claims tbr nttgfigent enlt-ustrn 
Under Idaho law, in order to establish a claim for negligence a Plaintiff must 
demonstrate ( I )  a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to coofirm to a certain 
(emphasis omitted), quoting Kirby v. SonviNe, 286 Or. 339,594 P.2d 8 18,82 1 (1 979); Ranrum v. 
Ci& of Garden Czp, 113 ldaho 202,208,743 P.2d 70,76 (1987) (holding that the ofEcer owed 
the same general duty to theplainhffthat applied to all members of  sociw). In this case, the fact 
that there is an express statute requiring owners and operators of tractors and farm implements to 
M E M O W U M  n?J OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
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have working tail lights when those implwents are transporfed on the public road after dark further 
mpp& the existence o f  Robatson's duty in his rnattm. As nuch thcre is no question that 
Robertson had a duty to use reasonable can to prevetlt hami ta othen by m d g  that the tractor and 
baler had working lights in any case where it was foreseeable that the tractor and baler would bc 
driven an apublicroad at night. As was discussed above, in this w e  it was mtirely foreseeable that 
Dustin Kukla would be opmating the tractor and baler at night and that the tractor and bdm would be 
above evidence demonstrates that Robertson loaned a tractor and baler to Dustin Kukfa whi~h 
did not have working tail lights. The evidence further demonstrates that Robertson h e w  Ihe tail 
lights did not work and took no steps to ensure that Dustin Kukla was aware of the non-working 
lights or that Dustin Kukla would not be &a 
testimony cited above also demonstrates that 
one parcel to another, and that moving the tractor snd baler would require 
public roads. Thus, a jury could certainly fmd that it was foreseeable to Robertson that Kukla 
would transport thc baler on the public road and that such transport might occur at night. 
Despite of the likelihood that the tractor and baler would be used at night without working tail 
lights, Robertson nevertheless allowed Dustin Kukla to borrow the tractor and balm without 
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informing him o f  the non-working lights and without taking any stcps to inquire about Dustin's 
fmirrg c x w e a ~ e  or practices. 
The evidence in th is case danonstrates that Robertson breached his duty by &owing 
Dustin Kukla to borrow the tractor and balm without (1) informing Dustin that the tail lights did not 
any steps to inquire about Dustin's exprrience io handling farm equipment or his 
lights, Robatson's lack ofknowledge regarding Kukla's farming practices, and the foreseeability o f 
the tractor and baler being used at night, Dustin Kukla would not have been driving the tractor and 
Finally, Robertson argues that he i s  entitled to suwnary judgment on Plaintiffs' 
claim for imputed liability because the tractor and baler are "implments of husbandry" under the 
provisions of the Idaho Motor Vehicle Act and the imputed liabiliestahite only applies to motor 
vehicles- Idaho Code 9 49-241 7 provides that "evny owner of a motor vehicle is liable and 
MEMORANDm IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
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responsible for the death o f  or injury to a person or property resulting b r n  negligence in the 
operation of his motor vehicle . . . by any pesson using or operating the vchicle with the 
permission, express or implied o f  the owner, and the negligence ofthoperson shall be imputed to 
the owner fm all purposes of civil damages." See I.C. $49-2417. Idaho Code @ 49-123(2)(g) 
defines "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is 
Ule tractor driven by Dustin Kukla and owned by DarreJl Robertson is clearly a motor vehicle 
because it is a "self-propelled"' vehicle. The definition of motor vehicle d 
exclude ''bp1ernea.t~ of husband 
qualify as an "impiment of husbandry" but an implement of husbandry can be a "motor 
vehicle." Such a conclusion i s  supported by other provisions of the act such as Idaho Code tj 49- 
902 which provides that it is unlawfbl for vehicles to be opcrated in an unsafe condition and 
without proper equipment, but specifically excludes farm tractors and implements of husbandry 
M I E M O W U M  IN OPIPOS~ION TO DEEENDANT DARRFJLL ROBERTSON'S MO'lTOi% 
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to to the extent spwifically referaced in certain provisions. See 1.c. 4 8 49-902 
- .  
and 49-9 1 6.  
merefore, baause an implement of husbane  falls within the plain d e f ~ t i o n  ofa 
motor vehicle within the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act, Idaho Code $49-123(2)(g) and Idaho Code 
$ 241 7 imputes liability to the o m  of motor vehicles for iojurirr auscd by the negligent acts 
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respec~i ly  request that Darmll 
Robemon's Motioa for Summary Judgmont be DENIED. 
JhU'ED this 7 ?  day of December, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, the ufidmigned, do bereby imify &at a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing 
DUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT was served upon the following: 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
SUSAN HUTER, individually as co- 
personal representative o f  the Estate of  
Kenneth Tiegs, and K.P. Inc., an Idaho 
corporation,, 
Plaintiffs, CASE NO. CV-2004-4001 
VS. NO. CV-2005-7739 




KENNETH TlEGS and SONS, INC., as 
subrogee of  UNIGARD INSURANCE, 
Plaintiffs, 
DUSTIN M. KUKLA and DARRELL L. 
ROBERTSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This is a civil matter. On January 3, 2008, Defendant Darrell Robertson's motion 
for summary judgment came before the court on oral argument. Mr. David Lloyd 
represented Mr. Robertson, while Mr. Eric Rossman represented the plaintiffs. For the 
reasons set out below, the court denies the motion for summary judgment. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT91 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
This matter possesses a long procedural history, going back to the original filing 
of the complaint on 26 April 2004. Because Defendant Robertson brings this summary 
judgment motion, the court states the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. 
Accordingly, the court borrows extensively from plaintiffs' brief recitation of the facts, 
that is, of which there exists no dispute. The matter before the court arises out of a 
collision between a vehicle driven by Kenneth Tiegs and a tractor pulling a baler driven 
by Defendant Dustin Kukla, but owned by another, Defendant Darrell Robertson. The 
collision occurred on 30 July 2003 and resulted in Kenneth Tiegs' death. Defendant 
Robertson sets out a more detailed statement of undisputed material facts in his 
December 7, 2007, Memorandum supporting his motion for summary judgment, to 
which the plaintiffs have not objected. 
In what was then denominated as CV 2005-7739, Tiegs, et al., filed an action as 
subrogees of Unigard Insurance against Kukla and Robertson. On 28 November 2005, 
Judge Hoff granted the motion to consolidate both matters. Prior to that consolidation, 
the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on 22 September 2005 in CV 2004-4001. 
Since Judge Hoff consolidated both actions against the defendants subsequent to the 
first amendment, plaintiffs' amended complaint in CV 2004-4001 does not mention the 
subrogation action. Nevertheless, since Judge Hoff consolidated both matters under 
CV 2004-4001, the first amended complaint need not mention the subrogation action. 
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Noteworthy, however, concerns the fact that Defendant Robertson previously 
sought summary judgment, heard and decided by Judge Hoff before the Trial Court 
Administrator assigned the consolidated matters to this court. On 8 March 2006, Judge 
Hoff entered an order summarily denying the Robertson motion. In entering the 
judgment against Defendant Robertson, Judge Hoff did not set forth any reasons for her 
decision, either in fact or law. 
After re-assignment and following pretrial and status conferences before this 
court, the parties began their trial of the issues on 25 September 2007. However, rightly 
or wrongly, based upon ts made to the jury durin e 
of the attorneys for Defendant Robertson, this court granted the plaintiffs' oral motion for 
mistrial. Hence, because Judge Hoff had not stated her reasons for denying Defendant 
Robertson's earlier motion for summary judgment, and because this court has some 
questions covering the basis for denial if made on the law, this court informed both 
sides that it would entertain further motions on summary judgment, even if covering the 
same issues argued before Judge Hoff. The court understands counsel for plaintiffs' 
mild complaint: "But for the mistrial declared by the Court, Defendant would not have 
had the opportunity to bring this same motion yet again."' 
Defendant Robertson filed his second go-round on 7 December 2007, and, as 
noted, the court heard oral argument on 3 January 2008. In his motion, Defendant 
Robertson asks this court to grant summary judgment in his favor on the claims of 
negligent entrustment, negligence per se, and imputed liability. For the reasons set out 
1 Counsel for plaintiffs, of course, made the motion for mistrial, perhaps underscoring the time-honored 
admonition: Be careful what you ask for. 
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below, the court denies summary judgment in favor the Defendant Robertson on the 
issues of negligence per se, imputed liability and negligent entrustment. 
ANALYSIS 
A. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN GENERAL 
Most ldaho trial lawyers know the summary judgment mantra by heart: Summary 
judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on 
file show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Hayes v, Unio aho 
204, 207, 141 P.3d 1073, 1076 (2006); Northwest Bee-Cop v. Home Living Sew., 136 
ldaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002); City of ldaho Falls v. Home Indemnity Co., 
126 ldaho 604, 606, 888 P.2d 383, 386 (1995). Through the summary judgment 
technique, then, trial courts view all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the 
non-moving party. Read v. Harvey, 141 ldaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005), 
reh'g denied. This means the moving party has the burden of proving the absence of 
genuine issue of material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Orthman v. ldaho Power, 130 ldaho 597, 
600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1 997). See also, G&M Farms v. Funk Imgation Co., 11 9 
ldaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). 
Nevertheless, while the court must liberally construe the facts and inferences 
contained in the existing record in favor of the party opposing the motion, still, to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must anchor its case 
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in something beyond speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence does not create a 
genuine issue. Samuel v. Hepworfh, Nungester, & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 ldaho 84, 87, 966 
P.2d 303, 306 (2000); Edwards v. Conchemco Inc., 11 1 ldaho 851, 853,727 P.2d 1279, 
1281 (Ct. App. 1986). Accordingly, the party opposing the motion for summary 
judgment may not simply rest on allegations contained in the pleadings; rather, the non- 
moving party must produce evidence by way of affidavit or deposition in order to 
contradict the assertions of the moving party. Ambrose v. Buhl School Dist. #12, 126 
ldaho 581, 584, 887 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ct. App. 1994). "Bare assertions that an issue 
of fact exists, in the face of particular facts alleged by a movant, are not s o 
create a genuine issue of fact." Cates V. Albertson's Inc., 126 ldaho 1030, 1033, 895 
P.2d 1223, 1226 (1995); Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 ldaho 270, 
274, 869 P.2d 1365, 1369 (1994). In other words, the nonmovant's response "must set 
forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
Having laid the foundation for the no-genuine-issue-of-material-fact standard, the 
existence of disputed facts, ironically, will still not defeat summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant if the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 
of an element essential to plaintiffs case, and on which plaintiff bears the burden of 
proof at trial. Ganee v. Barkley, 121 ldaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 
1992). Accordingly, facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when plaintiffs fail to 
establish a prima facie case. In such cases, there can be "no genuine issue of material 
fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id., citing 
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Celotex Corp. v. Catfee, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). Based upon these fundamental 
standards, the court now considers Defendant Robertson's motion for summary 
judgment. 
B. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT IN IDAHO COMPRISES AN EVOLVING 
CONCEPT 
Negligent entrustment exists in ldaho if for no other reason because it comprises 
"nothing more than a particularized application of the general tort principles contained in 
the concept of negligence." Olguin v. City of Burley, 119 ldaho 721, 
258 (1 99 I), reh'g denied, citing Ransom v. City of Garden City, 1 1 
743 P.2d 70, 74-76 (1987). As a species of tort, however, negligent entrustment 
appears to pop up first in Kinney v. Smith, 95 ldaho 328, 508 P.2d 1234 (1973). While 
lawyers and judges often hear that bad facts make bad law, Kinney v. Smith, supra, 
may stand for the proposition that peculiar facts require everyone to wait and see what 
the law really means. In Kinney, it seems the court and defendant's attorney 
understood the parties would try the case on damages, not liability. That, apparently, 
did not comport with the understanding of plaintiffs attorney. Nevertheless, the trial 
court sustained objections to the attempted admission of evidence offered to show the 
direct (as opposed to imputed) negligence of the person who loaned a car to an 
unlicensed driver. This resulted in the trial court never allowing the issue of "negligent 
entrustment" to go to the jury for its determination. Frankly, reading the opinion in its 
totality, particularly the quoted portions of the trial transcript, it leaves one with the 
abiding impression that the trial court seemed confused over what the parties intended 
for submission to the on their "stipulation" regarding liability. Accordingly, a unanimous 
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court reversed the matter, sending it back to the trial court with the following 
instructions: 
If, upon remand, the [car loaner] is found to have ne~lictentlv 
entrusted her vehicle to [the unlicensed driver], then 
judgment should be re-entered upon the jury verdict 
previously rendered. But if the [car loaner] is exonerated of 
such independent negligence, then the judgment finally 
entered should reflect a reduction of the jury verdict, so that 
the amount recovered from the [car loaner] does not exceed 
the limitations set forth in I.C. § 49-1404. 
95 ldaho at 334, 508 P.2d at 1240 (emphasis added). 
This brings us next to the oft-cited non-negligent entrustment case of Alegria v. 
Payonk, 101 ldaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), reh'g denied. This case allows us to 
discover what our Supreme Court considered at least some of the elements making up 
negligent entrustment. Ironically, Alegria v. Payonk, supra, a 3-2 decision (but with 
different personalities in the majority than the 3-2 decision it overruled) dealt with the 
thorny issue of the sale of alcohol to an apparently and obviously intoxicated minor as a 
contributing and actual cause of damage to a third party resulting from the made-even- 
more-intoxicated minor's subsequent and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 
Alegria overruled Meade v. Freeman, 93 ldaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969). Meade, of 
course, comprised the first (and apparently last) case in ldaho to recognize the lack of a 
cause of action in negligence at common law for serving obviously intoxicated 
individuals who later cause injury or death due to their intoxication while later operating 
a motor vehicle. Prior to Alegria, Justice Shepard, writing for the majority in Meade v. 
Freeman, supra, had this to say: 
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[Plaintiff's] theory [of liability against the bar owner for 
serving an obviously drunk person] runs squarely in the face 
of almost ail authority. It is nearly universally held [internal 
citations omitted] that it is the consumption of intoxicants that 
constitutes the proximate cause of damage to third parties 
resulting from the tortuous or unlawful acts of the consumer 
and that the vending of intoxicants is too remote to be 
considered a proximate cause. Put another way, the 
common law holds that it is not actionable negligence to 
serve intoxicants to an able bodied man [sic]. 
93 ldaho at 392,462 P.2d at 57.* 
So what does Alegria have to do with negligent entrustment in overruling Meade? 
Nothing, really, other than noting the Kinney decision and then ex upon it in 
dicta by stating, "The 'negligent entrustment' tort approved in Kinney is a recognition of 
the risk of injury which exists when two ingredients are combined; the automobile and 
an incompetent or incapacitated driver." 101 ldaho at 620, 61 9 P.2d at 138 (emphasis 
added). Therefore, in Alegria, we see the baseline of what our high Court had in mind 
in negligent entrustment of automobile cases (that is, within the context of a 
particularized application of general tort principles): an incompetent driver or an 
Alegda simply applied general tort principles to the inverse of loaning a car to an 
obviously intoxicated driver, that is, giving alcohol to an obviously intoxicated driver who 
* The comment by Justice Shepard for a 3-2 majority about serving alcohol to an "able bodied man" 
seems disingenuous. An individual served alcohol while in an obviously intoxicated state, and who later 
causes the death of another human being due to an incapacity caused by the intoxication, could hardly be 
considered "able bodied." Such person might have started out "able bodied," yet, after so many drinks, it 
is beyond cavil that one's ability to think, reason, and act in a rational and normal way becomes greatly 
diminished. The Court seems to have specifically recognized this fact in n.1 of Alegda in 95 ldaho at 620, 
619 P.2d at 138, much to Justice Shepard's constemation, as evidenced in his dissent in Alegria. 
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could reasonable be expected to get into a vehicle and drive some more.' It held that 
when a bar sells more alcohol to an obviously intoxicated driver, well knowing there 
exists a likelihood ( A M  forseeability) the intoxicated driver will get behind the wheel of 
a motor vehicle before he or she becomes sober, such conduct exposes the bar owner 
to liability for any death or damage caused by the driver, especially when the intoxicated 
driver is a minor. As the majority put it, "We perceive no justification for excusing the 
licensed vendor of intoxicants from the above [common law] general duty which each 
person owes all others in our society." 101 ldaho at 619, 619 P.2d at 137. Clearly, the 
context within which the trier of fact makes the determinati bar owner 
breached a duty to the public sounds in common law, garden-variety tort-not some 
fancy particularized application of tort principles. 
We come now to the question whether the jury in the 
present case should have been allowed to determine 
whether [the bar owners] engaged in the daily business of 
selling intoxicants for consumption on their premises, could 
reasonably have foreseen or anticipated that their sale of 
intoxicants to Payonk, whom they knew or should have 
known to be a minor and whom they knew or should have 
known to be actually, apparently and obviously intoxicated, 
might result in injury to appellants; and whether the conduct 
of [the bar owners] in so acting fell below that of the person 
of ordinary prudence acting under the same circumstances 
and conditions. 
Id. 
Perhaps one can argue that Alegria speaks to a kind of "negligent entrustment. of alcohol to an already 
intoxicated minor. Frankly, that seems illogical. Even a casual reading of the decision points to the 
application of general tort principles that hundreds of ldaho Law School graduates learned from none 
other than Professor George Bell, now of blessed memory. Professor Bell's training has empowered 
these practitioners (and jurists) to recognize general tort principles when they see them. 
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1. A Horse Is a Worst?, of Coursq of Course, unless Its Name fs Foreseeability 
A major, though hardly surprising, disagreement between the plaintiffs and 
Defendant Robertson centers on the nature of forseeability within the context of 
negligent entrustment. Although both common law tort and negligent entrustment use 
the term foreseeability, the question becomes whether it has the same import in both 
instances. Recent ldaho decisions have grappled with the definition of foreseeability, 
linking it to the concept of proximate cause. 
&' -
In Hayes v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra, the ldaho Supreme Court, among other 
things, held that a train operator's failure to blow specific emergency ns 
prior to the train colliding with a motor vehicle (killing the driver) did not provide a basis 
of recovery for the survivors. The Court further ruled that the fact the train exceeded its 
speed limit at a point twelve minutes prior to reaching the crossing and at another point 
thirty-eight miles from the crossing did not amount to the proximate cause of the 
accident as a matter of law. The plaintiffs had argued the railroad company was 
negligent because its train exceeded its specially imposed limit for the type of cargo it 
pulled (e.g., "but for" the increased speed, the train would not have been at the crossing 
when the local resident in his truck attempted to cross). In response to this argument, 
Justice Trout wrote for the unanimous majority. 
This argument ignores the foreseeability element of 
proximate cause. "Proximate cause consists of two factors, 
cause in fact and legal responsibility." Marias v. Marano, 
120 ldaho 11, 81 3 P.2d 350 (1991); See Doe I v. Sisters of 
Holy Cross, 126 ldaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995) 
[where the plaintiffs appealed the decision of the trial court 
on a summary judgment motion]. The "legal responsibility 
element of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of 
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the defendant's negligent act the Appellant's injury was 
reasonably foreseeable as a natural or probable 
consequence of the defendant's conduct." Doe, 126 ldaho at 
1041, 895 P.2d at 1234. "Only when reasonable minds 
could come to but one conclusion as to whether the 
Appellant's injury was reasonably foreseeable may the judge 
decide this legal responsibility as a matter of law." Id. 
143 Idaho at 208, 141 P.3d at 1077(bracketed material added for context). 
Justice Trout further noted, 
It is not reasonablv foreseeable that slight increases 
(or decreases, for that matter) in speed either twelve minutes 
or thirty-eight miles prior to the accident would result in the 
train arriving at the crossing at the exact time that Hayes' 
truck was on the tracks and thus cause an accident. The 
same argument could be made that had the train never left 
that day, the accident would not have been caused. Thus, 
as a matter of law, UPR's conduct was not the proximate 
cause of the accident and we affirm the district court's 
decision dismissing the excessive speed claim. 
Id (emphasis added). 
Justice Bistline, in an earlier decision, dealt with foreseeability where an intruder 
into an office building raped a female worker there. After a rehearing, the Court 
reversed the trial court's summary judgment that ruled against the worker-victim in her 
suit against the building owner, the security contractor, and the security service for 
failing to check all doors in the building where she worked. Justice Bistline noted, 
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which [sic] varies 
with the circumstances of each case. Where the degree of 
result or harm is crreat, but preventing it is not difficult, a 
relativelv low degree of foreseeabilitv is required. 
Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the 
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of 
foreseeability may be required. [Citations omitted.] Thus, 
foreseeabilitv is not to be measured by iust what is more 
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reasonable conduct. [Citations omitted.] 
Sharp v. W. H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300-01, 796 P.2d 506, 509-10 
(1 990)(emp hasis added). 
J 
In Doe v. Sisters of  the Holy Cross, supra, relied upon by our Supreme Court in 
the Hayes train-crossing decision, a minor and his parent brought an action against St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for sexual abuse suffered by the minor at the hands 
of a former employee of the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the hospital, finding the hospital had fired the employee before the molestation, 
hence, not proximately caused by the hospital (too remote in time). The Court of 
Appeals disagreed with the trial court's analysis. First, the boy had met the perpetrator 
at the hospital during his employment. Second, just before Doe left the hospital, the 
perpetrator gave Doe a phone number where Doe could contact him, asking him to call. 
Astoundingly, with his parents' permission thereafter, Doe began seeing the perpetrator 
and even spent the night with him at the perpetrators residence-with, again, the 
parent's permission. About this time, the hospital fired the perpetrator for inappropriate 
conduct with male employees at the hospital, namely, inviting them to his residence and 
promising them alcohol, although none had attained the age of 21 years. The Ada 
County Prosecutor charged the perpetrator with lewd conduct with a minor based upon 
his conduct with Doe, and the sentencing court sent him to prison. 
Doe and his father brought the action against the perpetrator under the theory 
the hospital had acted negligently in the hiring, supe~ising, and firing of a sexual 
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predator. On summary judgment, the sole issue centered on whether the hospital's 
stipulated breach of duty (further stipulated between the parties as the duty to use care 
in hiring and supervising its employees and to protect its patients from harm at the 
hands of its employees) had proximately caused Doe's injuries, namely, his molestation 
at the hands of the former hospital employee. 
While approving of Prosser and Keeton's approach to foreseeability analysis at 
footnote 2 of their decision4 Judge Lansing had this to say, 
We note that the ldaho Pattern Jury Instruction 230 
incorporates this [as explained in Alegda v. Payonk, supra] 
foreseeability standard by specifying that proximate cause 
means "a cause which, in natural or probable sequence, 
produced the complained injury, loss or damage.. . ." The 
term "natural or probable sequence" implies a requirement of 
foreseeability. 
... w e  conclude that the legal responsibility element 
of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of the 
defendant's negligent act the plaintiff's injury was reasonably 
foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the 
defendant's conduct (citing to the Prosser and Keeton 
footnote comment referenced above). 
126 ldaho at 1041, 895 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis in the original; bracketed material 
added for context). 
If, as seen, negligent entrustment amounts to nothing more than a particularized 
application of the general tort principles contained in the concept of negligence, does it 
mean, then, that courts will view "foreseeability" in the same way, regardless of its 
application in garden-variety, common law tort as opposed to a particularized negligent 
entrustment matter? If Justice Bistline was correct in his assessment (and until a higher 
W. Page Keeton, et a/., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984), at 55 42- 
43. 
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court says he was not, for purposes of this court, he was), foreseeablility amounts to a 
moving target. However, Defendant Robertson may not like the way it moves for him. 
Where the degree of harm is great but preventing the harm is not difficult, a relatively 
low degree of foreseeability operates, not one of a higher degree. Indeed, all Defendant 
Robertson would have had to do to "prevent" the harm contemplated by ldaho Code § 
49-916, at least for his part, was simply not loan it to Kukla until he (or Kukla, for that 
matter) fixed the lights to work properly. 
If foreseeability in ldaho po 
principles to the negligent entrustment paradigm-at least as it relates to the harm 
flowing from the natural or probable consequence of the actor's conduct. This becomes 
particularly evident when one considers the essential elements of negligent entrustment 
generally recognized in the United States. 
In an action based on the theory of neglige 
entrustment, the plaintiff must prove that: 
(I) the entrustee was incompetent, unfit, 
inexperienced, or reckless; 
(2) the entrustor knew (in some jurisdictions 
"actually" knew), should have known, or had 
reason to know of the entrustee's condition or 
proclivities; 
(3) there was an entrustment of the dangerous 
instrumentality; 
(4) the entrustment created an appreciable risk of 
harm to others; and 
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(5) the harm to the injury victim was "pr~ximately'~ 
or "legally" caused by the negligence of the 
entrustor and the entrustee. 
57A AM. JUR. 20 Negligence 5 3 1 8 (2004). 
The plaintiffs correctly point out that our Supreme Court adopted the general 
definition of negligent entrustment from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Their 
counsel goes on to state, "Nothing in Ransom [v. City of Garden City, supra] purports to 
limit the tort to cases of intoxicated or incapacitated drivers." That, of course, is true. 
Nevertheless, one should never overlook the obvious, namely, Ransom dealt with an 
intoxicated person with whom a police officer had 
officer handed over the keys, he simply gave a warning to the intoxicated passenger 
that he could not drive the car. (The police had already arrested the driver). Instead, 
the police instructed the intoxicated passenger that he should keep trying to get a ride, 
something the passenger had unsuccessful managed throughout the officer's presence 
at the scene of the arrest. What followed next was easily predictable (AKA 
foreseeable). After the police cleared the arrest scene, the intoxicated passenger, 
now-turned-impaired driver, unattended (and possessing the keys to the car left with 
him) promptly entered the car, drove the wrong way down a one-way street, and 
collided head-on with another vehicle. Following Justice Bistline's paradigm, 
preventing this harm would have been relatively easy, viz. after arresting the driver, the 
police simply do not give the keys to a car left behind to an intoxicated, left behind 
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passenger.5 This court has not overlooked the fact that Defendant Robertson points 
with significant energy to the comments of Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 308 (1965) 
in Ransom. In particular, Defendant Robertson wants to ensure this court and the 
plaintiffs understand Comment b. The Court does; however, it cannot speak for the 
plaintiffs. Quoting from Defendant Robertson's initial memorandum in support of his 
motion for summary judgment filed on 7 December 2007: "The rule may also apply 'if 
the third person's known character or the peculiar circumstances of the case are such 
as to give the actor good reason to believe that the third person mav misuse it."' See 
DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MEMORA ed) . 
There exists enough in the deposition material submitted to this court to make the 
underlined portions a jury question. 
Ironically, perhaps more telling is what the plaintiffs do in quoting the definition of 
negligent entrustment from the Restatement (Second) of Torts in their memorandum of 
opposition, perhaps to bolster their argument. Plaintiffs leave off its very significant title: 
"Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in ~ctivi t ies."~ (Emphasis 
added.) Reading the Restatement (Second) of Torts on negligent entrustment 
(including its title) and the Am. Jur. 2d material set out above, it seems clear that the 
5 What is particularly aggravating about this case, apart from the obvious, amounts to the police turning 
the intoxicated passenger into an intoxicated pedestrian, a misdemeanor, if they leave him at the side of a 
road. See ldaho Code (j 49-1426. 
ldaho has a long-standing rule of statutory construction providing that where the meaning of a statute 
lacks clarity, resort may be had to consideration of the statutory heading as an aid in ascertaining 
legislative intent. See e.g., Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corp. of ldaho, 102 ldaho 266, 268, 629 P.2d 
662, 664 (1981), reh'g denied. This court is unaware of the same principle applying with precision in 
discerning the meanings of the various Restatement declarations. Nevertheless, in consideration of (j 
308's title, and in those cases in ldaho quoting either the Restatement (Second on Torts) or Ransom 
where negligent entrustment was an issue, some "improper" person is always at the heart of the 
discussion. 
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particularized notion of applying general tort principles to entrustment in Idaho has to do 
with entrusting a "dangerous instrumentality," assumed herein to be a motorized vehicle 
towing a hay baler, to someone otherwise incompetent, unfit, inexperienced, or 
reckless. Further, the person doing the entrusting either must know or should have 
known (or at least have had some reason to know) that the person so entrusted with the 
instrumentality constituted an "improper" person to have the instrumentality in the first 
place because it created an appreciable risk of harm to others. 
What in the record, then, supports the notion of incompetence, unfitness, 
inexperienced, or, perhaps most relevant, recklessness with regard to Darrell Robertson 
loaning Dustin Kukla a tractor and hay baler? Put another way, how was Dustin Kukla 
incompetent, unfit, inexperienced, or reckless in handling tractors or hay balers that 
Darrell Robertson knew about, should have known, or had reason to know? At 
argument, counsel mentioned that Mr. Robertson should have known or had reason to 
know that Dustin Kukla would move the baler at night. Baling at night seems to be the 
custom in these parts. See generally the March 11, 2005 deposition of Darrell L 
Robertson at page 38, line 25; page 39, lines 1-6. Should one be able to conclude 
naturally, then, that if one bales at night, we can expect the person operating the baler 
to move it on a highway at night? That seems to be a jury question. Even if one 
concludes that under the foreseeability concept of Tort as practiced in Idaho, it dictated 
Kukla most likely would move the baler at night on a highway, does evidence exist 
pointing to lacking experience, fitness or competence, or being reckless. Again, that 
remains a question for the jury, as set out more fully below. 
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2. Material Issues of Fact Are Present For Negligent Entrustment 
As already noted in Doe v. Sisters of Holy Cross, supra, resolving proximate 
cause and foreseeability questions is best left to the province of the trier of fact. The 
plaintiffs have demanded a jury trial in this litigation. In the matter before the court, 
reasonable minds could definitely come to differing conclusions on whether Defendant 
Robertson's act of loaning his tractor and hay baler to Dustin Kukla, under the peculiar 
circumstances of this case, could reasonablv be foreseen as the start point of a first- 
order effect (not even having to consid 
and probably led to Kenneth T 
er second- or third-order effects) that natural1 
this court to make that decision. 
For example, the jury must decide whether Defendant Robertson could 
reasonably foresee that Dustin Kukla would likely drive a tractor and baler missing 
proper lamps on a highway at night. They could very well base their decision upon 
expert testimony that in Canyon County, at least, one ex and ranchers to 
drive balers on highways at night. The "expert" testimony could be nothing more than a 
series of farmers and ranchers testifying about common practices among their fellow 
ranchers and farmers, all of which they have personal familiarity. Thus, the parties must 
call upon the jury to decide if Defendant Robertson's act of loaning a tractor and baler to 
Dustin Kukla without informing Kukla about the lamps on the baler failing to comply with 
Idaho law for nighttime operation constituted a negligent act that naturally led to the 
death of Kenneth Tiegs. That is, the jury must decide the nexus in this series of events 
because, as set out more fully in the next section, resolution of material issues of fact 
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remain. Compare e.g., Dustin Kukla deposition of April 26, 2005, at page 117, lines 16- 
25; page 118, lines 1-2 with Darrell Robertson deposition of March 11, 2005, at page 
52, line 25, page 53, lines 1-25; page 54, line I; 
C. A GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT ALSO EXIST ON NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIM 
The plaintiffs also assert that Defendant Robertson committed negligence per se 
when Defendant Kukla operated the tractor and baler on Highway 45 at night without 
properly operating lights. Defendant Robertson, on the other hand, asserts no 
negligence per se exists because no evidence exists supporting the notion that 
Robertson caused or knowingly permitted Kukla to operate the equipment on a public 
roadway after sunset without proper lighting equipment. In supporting his assertion 
about the lack of negligence per se, Defendant Robertson focuses on Idaho Code § 49- 
902. That provision states the following: 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or move, or 
for the owner to cause or knowinalv permit to be driven or 
moved on any hiahwav any vehicle or combination of 
vehicles which is in an unsafe condition as to endanger any 
person, or which does not contain those parts or is not at all 
times equipped with the lamps and other requirements in 
proper condition and adjustment, as required by the 
provisions of this chapter, or which is equipped in any 
manner in violation of the ~rovisions of this chapter. 
(2) Nothing contained in the provisions of this chapter shall 
be construed to prohibit the use of additional parts and 
accessories on any vehicle not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter. 
(3) The ~rovisions of this chapter, with respect to equipment 
on vehicles, shall not apply to implements of husbandry, 
road machinew, road rollers, farm tractors or slow movinq 
vehicles except as otherwise specificallv made applicable. 
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ldaho Code 5 49-902 (emphasis added). 
Clearly, the legislature specifically exempted "implements of husbandry" (along 
with road machinery, road rollers, farm tractors or other slow moving vehicles) from the 
operation of Chapter 9 of Title 49 of the ldaho Code for equipment purposes, unless, 
s~ecificallv~ the legislature makes such vehicles applicable. Hence, we must now 
consider ldaho Code 5 49-916 because first, the plaintiffs focus on it to make their claim 
of negligence per se, and second, it discusses implements of husbandry and lighting 
equipment requi ect matter at the very heart of this litigation. 
Defendant Robertson, in his Memorandum in support of his motion for 
summary judgment, admits that the baler was not equipped for nighttime operation on a 
public roadway in accordance with ldaho Code 5 49-916. The latter provision reads as 
follows. 
49-916. LAMPS ON FARM TRACTORS, FARM 
EQUIPMENT AND IMPLEMENTS OF HUSBANDRY. 
(1) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled farm 
equipment unit or implement of husbandry pJ equipped with 
an electric lighting system shall at all times specified in 
section 49-903, ldaho Code,' be equipped with at least one 
(1) lamp displaying a white light visible from a distance of not 
less than five hundred (500) feet to the front of the vehicle 
and shall also be equipped with at least one (1) lamp 
displayinn a red light visible from at least the same distance 
to the rear of the vehicle, and two (2) red reflectors visible 
from a distance of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600) 
7 ldaho Code $ 49-903 requires every vehicle upon a highway at any time from sunset to sunrise, among 
other times of limited visibility, to have liahted lamps and illuminating devices. However, the notion that 
ldaho Code $ 49-903 limits the time when operable headlamps are required for automobiles was soundly 
rejected by our Court of Appeals in State v. Evans, 134 ldaho 560, 6 P.3d 416 (Ct. App. 2000). As 
detailed post, the reasoning applied in Evans to interpreting the effect of the interplay of ldaho Code $49- 
903 with ldaho Code $ 49-902(1), should equally apply to ldaho Code $ 49-916. The issue presented in 
the statutes amounts to one of safety, not some ill-devised exclusionary rule for a certain class of ldaho 
residents, namely farmers and ranchers moving unsafe implements of husbandry on Idaho's highways. 
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feet to the rear when illuminated by the upper beams of head 
lamps. Lights required in this section shall be positioned so 
that one ( I )  lamp showing to the front and one (1) lamp or 
reflector showing to the rear will indicate the further 
projection of the tractor, unit or implement on the side of the 
road used in passing the vehicle. 
(2) Every combination of farm tractor and towed unit of 
farm equipment or implement of husbandry not equipped 
with an electric lighting system shall at all times specified in 
section 49-903, ldaho Code, be equipped with the following: 
(a) At least one (I) lamp mounted to indicate as 
nearly as practicable the extreme left projection of the 
combination and dis~lavinq a white light visible from a 
distance of not less than five hundred (500) feet to the 
front of the combination; 
(b) Two (2) red reflectors visible from a distance one 
hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to the rear of 
the combination when illuminated by the upper beams 
of head lamps. The reflectors shall be mounted in a 
manner to indicate as nearly as practicable the extreme 
left and right rear projections of the towed unit or 
implement on the highway. 
(3) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled unit of 
farm equipment of implement of husbandry equipped with an 
electric lightina system shall at all times specified in section 
49-903, ldaho Code, be equipped with two (2) single-beam 
or multi~le-beam head lamps meeting the requirements of 
sections 49-922 or 49-924, ldaho Code, respectivelv or, as 
an alternative, section 49-926, ldaho Code, and two (2) red 
lamps visible from a distance of not less than five hundred 
(500) feet to the rear, or in the alternative, one (1) red  lam^ 
visible from a distance of not less than five hundred (500) 
feet to the rear and two (2) red reflectors visible from a 
distance of one hundred (100) to six hundred (600) feet to 
the rear when illuminated by the upper beams of head 
lamps. Red lamps or reflectors shall be mounted in the rear 
of the farm tractor or self-propelled implement of husbandry 
to indicate as nearly as practicable the extreme left and right 
projections of the vehicle on the highway. 
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(4) The farm tractor element of every combination of farm 
tractor and towed farm equipment or towed implement of 
husbandry equipped with an electric lighting system shall at 
all times specified in section 49-903, ldaho Code, be 
equipped with two (2) single-beam or multiple-beam head 
lamps meeting the requirements of sections 49-922, 49-924, 
or 49-926, ldaho Code. 
ldaho Code § 49-916 (emphasis added). 
f . Statutory Construction in General 
When interpreting a statute, courts must construe the statute as a whole in order 
to give effect to the legislative intent. Paoline v. Albertson's lnc.,143 ldaho 547, 549, 
149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006); State v. Evans, 134 ldaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 4 
App. 2000); George Watkins Family v. Messeng@r, 118 ldaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 
1385, 1387-88 (1 990); Zener v. Velde, 135 ldaho 352, 355, 17 P.3d 296, 299 (Ct. App. 
2000), rev. denied. Accordingly, the plain language of the statute generally determines 
legislative intent. Id; State v. Nunes, 131 ldaho 408, 409, 958 P.2d 34, 35 (Ct. App. 
1998). The plain meaning of a statute prevails unless at least one of two factors comes 
into play: (1) clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary to the plain meaning or (2) 
the plain meaning leads to an absurd result. Watkins Family, 118 ldaho at 540, 797 
P.2d at 1388; Zener, 135 ldaho at 355, 17 P.3d at 299. See also State v. Rhode, 133 
ldaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). Statutory interpretation, then, "must begin 
with the literal words of the statute" and these words "must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning." McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 ldaho 810, 813, 
135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Plain language is "always to be preferred to any curious, 
narrow hidden sense." State v. Mercer, 143 ldaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006). 
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It is axiomatic, then, that when statutory language is plain and unambiguous, 
statutory interpretation is not necessary. Haydtjn Lake Fire Profecfion Disf. v. Aicom, 
141 ldaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005). That is to say, when statutes possess 
clarity and a lack of ambiguity, courts must "interpret" them in accordance with their 
language; meaning courts must follow them as enacted-not even reviewing courts may 
apply rules of construction. State v. Evans, supra; Sfafe v. Dewbre, 133 ldaho 663, 
665-66, 991 P.2d 388, 390-91 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131 ldaho 484, 
485, 959 P.2d 465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). Ironically, plain statutory language can exist 
even where parties present different to the court. Ambiguity, on the other 
hand, occurs where "reasonable minds might differ as to interpretations." Id. 
We know from State v. Evans, supra, that ldaho Code § 49-903 does not qualify 
when the "lamps and other requirements" must be on motor vehicles for purposes of 
ldaho Code § 49-902, simply when they must be "turned on." That is to say, "This 
statute [ldaho Code § 49-9031 does not authorize the operation of vehicles with 
inoperable headlights on ldaho highways." 134 ldaho at 564, 6 P.3d at 420. Judge 
Schwartzman goes on to illustrate why the Court of Appeals came to this conclusion. 
For numerous reasons, operable headlights may be 
unexpectedly required long before sunset; sudden changes 
of weather; agricultural dust; smoke from burning fields or 
forest fires to name a few. We therefore conclude that 
Evans' reading of I.C. 5 49-903 as permitting the o~eration 
of vehicles with ino~erable headlights before sunset is 
inconsistent with Idaho's policy off providing safe highwav 
system. 
Id (emphasis added). 
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Herein, Defendant Robertson makes a similar argument. He essentially argues 
that it is permissible to move farm equipment (otherwise equipped with an electrical 
lighting system) on the highways of this state, even if their lighting systems do not 
function properly, provided drivers do not move them after sunset or before sunrise. 
Yet, there are other times required apart from hours of darkness under ldaho Code 3 
49-903 when the legislature expects the lighting system to be operational, namely, "any 
other time where there is not sumcient light to render clearly discernable persons and 
vehicles on the highway at a distance of five hundred (500) feet ahead ...IJ 
Consistent with the reasoning in State v. Evans, s ode § 49-916 
refers to ldaho Code § 49-903 for the times machinery operators must turn on the lights. 
The lighting systems, otherwise required, must be turned on during those times set out 
in ldaho Code § 49-903. Clearly, the legislature expects the lighting systems to be 
operational at all times. Around these parts, blowing dust can obscure a roadway at 
any time during the summer, not to mention smoke from forest fires. Accordingly, if the 
lighting equipment is not operational as required by ldaho Code 5 49-916 with regard to 
farm equipment, one simply does not move it on a highway. To do so, violates the plain 
provisions of the statutory law, which Defendant Robertson allowed with Dustin Kukla. 
Finally, to contend, as Defendant Robertson apparently does, that ldaho Code § 
49-916 defines no duty for the owner versus the operator-meaning that no duty for the 
owner equals no liability for the owner-seems to fall short of the mark, at least when 
one considers the statutes in pan' materia, which this court must. "'Statutes that are in 
pan'materia must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pan' 
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materia if they relate to the same subject."' Paolini v. Albertan's lm., supra, citing City 
of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Disf., 139 ldaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 
The entirety of Chapter 9 of Title 49 of the ldaho Code deals with Vehicle 
Equipment. ldaho Code 5 49-902 covers what its title calls "Scope and effect." 
Subsection (3) of this paragraph specifically addresses "implements of husbandry," also 
specifically addressed in Idaho Code 5 49-916. It seems, then, that courts must 
construe ldaho Code 5 49-902 in pan' materia with ldaho Code 5 49-916 since both deal 
with equipment going to the very heart of safety and contained within the same chapter. 
To make ldaho Code $j 49-916 a stand-alone provision, thus allowing the owner of an 
implement of husbandry to escape culpability when the scope and effect provision 
(Idaho Code 5 49-902) clearly states, "It shall be unlawful for any person to drive, or 
move, or for the owner to cause or knowinalv permit to be driven or moved on any 
highway, etc.," seems to lead to an absurd result. Litigants and other interested 
observers have traditionally expected courts to guard against absurd results. Watkins 
Family, supra. 
2. Negligence Per Se 
To appropriate the doctrine of negligence per se as a basis for imposing liability 
in Idaho, the injured party must show four things. First, the statute must clearly define 
the standard of conduct. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian lrrigafion District, 97 ldaho 580, 
586, 548 P.2d 80, 86 (1976) reh'gs denied (where the Court concluded that since ldaho 
Code 5 42-1204 did not clearly define the standard of conduct, injured parties could not 
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use it to hold an irrigation district accountable under the doctrine of negligence per se; 
the court, however, concluded the trial court had used the statute for imposing a duty in 
its findings, not imposing liability). Second, the legislature must have intended the 
statute to prevent the type of harm caused. Stephens v. Steams, 106 ldaho 249, 257 
678 P.2d 41, 49 (1984) reh'g denied (where the Court found that an architect failing to 
comply with an ordinance regarding stairways and handrails constituted negligence per 
se since the Court concluded the ordinance was designed to protect users from the very 
type of injury suffered by the plaintiff). Third, the plaintiff must be of the class of persons 
intended for protection under the statute or code in the first instance. Kinney v. Smith, 
supra at 331, 508 P.2d at 1237 (1973) (where the Court concluded that an owner of a 
vehicle who knowingly permitted another person with a suspended license to drive the 
owner's car violated the provisions of ldaho Code 5 49-339, hence negligence per se)! 
Finally, the violation of the statute or code must comprise the proximate cause of the 
injury. Leliefield v. Johnson, 104 ldaho 357, 370, 659 P.2d 111, 124 (1983) (Even 
though a violation of a statute enacted for public safety is negligence per se, the 
violation must also be the proximate cause of the injury to constitute actionable 
negligence). See also O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 ldaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005). 
Using the above-cited authority as a template for determining as a matter of law 
whether ldaho Code 5 49-916, in conjunction with ldaho Code 5 49-902, may be 
advanced by the plaintiffs as a basis for negligence per se, this court answers in the 
Now re-designated as ldaho Code $ 49-333. As Chief Justice Donaldson noted. "In our view. I.C. $49- 
339 is designed to protect other highway users from injuries caused by the negligence of unlicensed 
drivers." 95 ldaho at 331, 508 P.2d at 1237. 
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affirmative. This court has already considered Defendant Robertson's knowledge 
based upon his experience in farming practices that farmers and ranchers in Canyon 
County typically perform hay baling in the evening hours after sunset, referenced in his 
March 11, 2005 deposition. The issue, however, centers on resolving whether 
Defendant Robertson "caused" to be driven, or, in the alternative, "knowingly permittedJJ 
to be driven or moved on any highway, the tractor and baler loaned to Dustin Kukla. 
That is clearly undisputed when Defendant Robertson allowed Dustin Kukla to drive off 
with his tractor and baler during daytime hours with the defective lighting equipment. 
Since Defendant Robertson put into motion (by loaning machinery to K 
events that led to the death of Kenneth Tiegs, it remains for the jury to decide whether 
there exists a nexus between Robertson's loaning his machinery to Kukla and 
Robertson "causing or knowingly permittingJJ Kukla to operate the equipment on 
Highway 45 at the time and place that resulted in Kenneth Tiegs' demise. 
D. IMPUTED LIABILITY DOES APPLY BECAUSE A TRACTOR PULLING A BALER 
MEETS THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR VEHICLE FOR PURPOSES OF IDAHO CODE 
5 49-2417. 
Using the techniques of statutory construction, ante, it appears that an implement 
of husbandry (i.e., a tractor pulling a hay baler) constitutes a motor vehicle for purposes 
of Idaho Code § 49-2417. The legislature has elected to define implements of 
husbandry 'as follows. 
"Implements of husbandryJ' means evew vehicle includinq 
self-propelled units, designed or adapted and used 
exclusively in agricultural, horticultural, dairy and livestock 
growing and feeding operations when being incidentally 
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. Such implements include, but are not limited to, 
combines, discs, dry and liquid fertilizer spreaders, cargo 
tanks, harrows, hay balers, harvesting and stacking 
equipment, pesticide applicators, plows, swathers, mint tubs 
and mint wagons, and farm wagons. A farm tractor when 
attached to or drawina any implement of husbandry shall be 
construed to be an implement of husbandry. "Implements of 
husbandry" do not include semitrailers, nor do they include 
motor vehicles or trailers, unless their design limits their use 
to agricultural, horticultural, dairy or livestock grow in^ and 
feeding operations. 
ldaho Code 5 49-1 10(2)(emphasis added). 
What is readily apparent from this definition is that it comprises a highly specific 
description of what constitutes "implements of husbandry" in t orthy is 
the addition in the list of examples of hay balers. ldaho Code 5 49-1 10(2), when read in 
conjunction with ldaho Code 5 49-123(2)(d), makes it clear that a farm tractor attached 
to or pulling "any implement of husbandry,''-if it might be considered something else, 
otherwise-"shall be construed as an implement of husbandry." Hence, Defendant 
Robertson's tractor pulling his hay baler is not a farm vehicle, but rather, an implement 
of husbandry. 
As suggested already, imputed liability comprises a creature of ~ ta tu te .~  Thus, 
whether Defendant Robertson's motorized machinery coupled together and driven by 
Dustin Kukla on the fateful evening in question amounts to a motor vehicle for purposes 
of imputing liability under the auspices of ldaho Code § 49-2417 amounts to an exercise 
of statutory construction. Unfortunately, the process of statutory construction can seem 
more circular and iterative than linear and progressive. Nevertheless, the real issue 
presented to this court on the issue of imputed liability involving a hay baler and tractor, 
See generally PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS g 73 (W. KEETON 5th ed. 1984). 
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comes down to this: whether the legislature intended to exclude "implements of 
husbandryJJ from the definition of "motor vehicleJ' for purposes of Idaho's imputed liability 
statute. The reason this becomes an exercise in statutory construction centers on the 
fact the legislature does not state in the general definition of motor vehicle or, frankly, in 
the definition of 'implement of husbandryJ1 that the two are mutually exclusive, at least 
for purposes of imputed liability. 
ldaho Code § 49-2417 addresses a "motor vehicleJJ owner's liability in tort for the 
negligence of another. Its pertinent provisions, in view of the facts presented, comprise 
the following. 
(1) Every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and 
responsible for the death of or injury to a person or property 
resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor 
vehicle, in the business of the owner or otherwise, by any 
person using or operating the vehicle with the permission, 
expressed or implied, of the owner, and the negligence of 
the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of 
civil damages. 
(2) The liability of an owner for im~uted neqligence 
imposed by the provisions of this section and not arising 
through the relationship of principal and agent or master and 
servant is limited to the amounts set forth under "proof of 
financial res~onsibility" in section 49-1 17, ldaho Code, or the 
limits of the liability insurance maintained bv the owner, 
whichever is areater. 
(3) In any action against an owner for imputed negligence 
as imposed by the provisions of this section the operator of 
the vehicle whose negligence is imputed to the owner shall 
be made a defendant party if personal service of process 
can be had upon that operator within Idaho. Upon recovery 
of a judgment, recourse shall first be had against the 
property of the operator so served. 
(4) In the event a recovery is had under the provisions of 
this section against an owner for imputed negligence the 
owner is subrogated to all the rights of the person injured 
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and may recover from the operator the total amount of any 
judgment and costs recovered against the owner. If the 
bailee of an owner with the permission, expressed or 
implied, of the owner, permits another to operate the motor 
vehicle of the owner, then the bailee and the driver shall both 
be deemed operators of the vehicle of the owner, within the 
meaning of subsections (3) and (4) of this section. 
(5) Where two (2) or more persons are injured or killed in 
one (1) accident, the owner may settle or pay any bona fide 
claim for damages arising out of personal injuries or death, 
whether reduced to a judgment or not, and the payments 
shall diminish to the extent of the owners' total liability on 
account of the accident. Payments so made, aggregating the 
full sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), shall extinguish 
all liability of the owner hereunder to the claimants and all 
other persons on account of the accident. Liability may exist 
by reason of imputed negligence, pursuant to this section, 
and not arising through the negligence of the owner nor 
through the relationship of principal and agent nor master 
and servant. 
ldaho Code § 49-2417(emphasis added). 
What is a motor vehicle, at least in general terms? ''Every vehicle which is self- 
propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from 
overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by 
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelc 
ldaho Code § 49-123(2)(g)(emphasis added). One must not overlook the glaring fact 
that the legislature did not except "implements of husbandryJJ from this definition when it 
excepted "vehicles moved solely by human power (which seems somewhat of a waste 
of ink), electric personal assistive mobility devices, and motorized wheelchairs. 
Whether the imputed negligence statute applies to the facts of this case, then, depends 
upon whether the legislature intended that a tractor pulling a hay baler constitutes a 
motor vehicle for purposes of imputed liability. Again, not surprisingly Defendant 
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Robertson claims this provision does not apply while the plaintiffs are quite certain that it 
does. 
Without question, a tractor pulling a hay baler constitutes an "implement of 
husbandry." What remains to be answered, however, is the "So what?" question. 
Inventorying and considering all of the statutes found by this court that include the terms 
"implement(s) of husbandry" or "vehicles of husbandry," there exist specific and solid 
public policy reasons for excluding "husbandry vehicles from specific requirements. 
However, these ex 
equipment issues. F 
and C license known as a "seasonal driver's license," that allows the operation of 
certain commercial vehicles in farm-related industries under restrictions imposed by the 
department of transportation. However, these seasonal driver's licenses are not valid 
for driving vehicles carrying hazardous materials that require placarding, unless certain 
exceptions apply. Those exceptions include transporting diesel fuel, provided the 
quantity does not exceed one-thousand gallons, transportin 
or implements of husbandry, provided the total capacity o f t  
three thousand gallons, or solid plant nutrient 
mixture with any organic substance. Hence, through this statute, we discover how the 
legislature makes exception for an "implement of husbandry," that is, it does so by 
specific reference to an "implement of husbandry." Several other examples exist, as 
well. 
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To determine "gross combination weight rating (GCWR) in ldaho Code 3 49- 
108(2), the legislature chose not to include implements of husbandry. Similarly, the 
legislature, by specific term, excluded "implements of husbandry" from its definition of 
"utility type vehicle (UTV)" found at ldaho Code 5 49-122(8) and again in ldaho Code § 
67-7101. Under ldaho Code § 49-302(1), the legislature specifically exempted persons 
from driver's licensing requirements if they operate an implement of husbandry 
"incidentally" on a highway, as long as their license is not otherwise suspended, 
canceled, revoked, disqualified, denied or refused. Again, the legislature specifically 
used the term "implement of husbandryJJ to make this exclusion. The legislature also 
exempted, with specificity, "implements of husbandryJJ from motor vehicle registration 
requirements pursuant to ldaho Code 5 49-426(2). The legislature has also specifically 
used the term "implement of husbandry" to exclude the requirement of persons under 
eighteen years of age to wear approved safety helmets where they use motorcycles or 
ATVs as implements. The legislature did so by specific use of the term, occupants of 
"implements of husbandry." See ldaho Code § 49-673(2)(b). 49-673(2)(b). By specific 
term of "implement of husbandry", the legislature exempted implements of husbandry 
from width requirements, provided they are only "incidentally" being operated upon a 
highway from one (1) farm operation to another during daylight hours and display a red 
or fluorescent orange flag of twelve by twelve inches on the outermost left projection of 
the implement being transported. ldaho Code § 49-4 01 O(l)(a)-(c). By definition, the 
legislature has chosen to exclude, with specificity, "vehicles of husbandryJJ and "vehicles 
registered pursuant to ldaho Code §§ 49-402 and 49-402A from the definition of a farm 
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vehicle. Hence, when the legislature has wanted to exclude '7mplement(s) [or vehicles] 
of husbandry" from a requirement, it has consistently done so by specifically referring to 
these vehicles. 
Accordingly, has the legislature exempted "implement of husbandryJJ from the 
requirements of ldaho Code 5 49-2417? Without question, "implement of husbandryJJ is 
not referenced in this statute, nor is the term referenced in the general definition of 
motor vehicle found in ldaho Code 5 49-123(g). It is one thing for the legislature to say 
"'Implements off husbandry' do not inclu ss their design limits 
their [i.e., the motor vehicles'] use to agricult or livestock growing 
and feeding operations," which, of course it does proclaim in ldaho Code § 49-1 1 O(2). If 
this meant the legislature intended for motor vehicles to encompass "implements of 
husbandry," that is, since "implements of husbandryJJ do not include motor vehicles 
unless they are limited to agricultural, horticultural, dairy or livestock growing and 
feeding operations, motor vehicles, by implied definition, do not include "implements of 
husbandry, " the legislature wasted its time, ink, and confused judges by specifically 
exempting "implements of husbandryJJ from the operation of ldaho Code § 49-902, 
unless otherwise specifically made applicable, while not specifically exempting such 
implements from the specific definition of "motor vehicleJJ contained in ldaho Code $j 49- 
123(g) and as applied in ldaho Code $j 49-2417. 
Using the plain meaning of the statutes, interpreting them in pan materia, this 
court is certain that the legislature has not implicitly excluded owners of "implements of 
husbandryJJ when otherwise "self-propelled" from the operation of ldaho Code 5 49- 
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2417. To be sure, hay balers do not constitute motor vehicles. However, tractors that 
pull them, being self-propelled, do comprise motor vehicles for purposes of the general 
definition, and, unless a Higher Court or the legislature says otherwise, for purposes of 
ldaho Code ldaho Code $ 49-2417. This court is surprised that it came to this 
conclusion, but having seen how the legislature excepts "implements of husbandry" 
from the operation of statutes when it does not want such implements implicated in the 
operation of the statute in question, and seeing how "implements of husbandry" are not 
excluded from either the definition of motor vehicle or the operation of ldaho Code 5 49- 
2417, the court is convinced that if the legislature wanted to exclude "implements of 
husbandry," from Idaho's imputed negligence statute, it would have done so. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should deny the summary judgment motions of Defendant Robertson. 
The court will adhere to the original decision by Judge Hoff. 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT: 
I. The court DENIES Defendant Robertson's motion for summary judgment. 
2. If the parties are prepared, they will try the matter before a jury beginning 
March 24, 2008, beginning at 0930 a.m., for five days. 
3. If the parties are not prepared to go on that date, they will forthwith inform the 
undersigned's secretary and arrange a new scheduling conference. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-34 
D A T E P F s  7" day of February, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"I The undersigned certifies that on day of February, 2008, s h e  sewed a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the 
following individuals in the manner described: 
Upon Eric S. Rossman, ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, at 737 ~ . 7 ~  Street, 
Boise, Idaho 83702, Terrance R. White, WWITE PETERSON, at 5700 East 
Franklin Road, Ste. 200, Nampa, Idaho 83687 , and upon Jan P. Malmberg, 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY, P.O. Box 364, Logan Utah 84323, attorneys 
for plaintiffs, and upon 
Rodney R. Saetrum and David W. Lloyd, SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, aMomeys 
for the Defendant Robertson, at P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707 
when s h e  deposited each a copy in the U.S. Mail with sufficient postage to individuals 
at the addresses listed above. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court 
- 
By: I 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-35 
000452 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J DRAKE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
BRUCE TIEGS, STEVEN TIEGS; and 
SUSAN HUTER, 
Plaintiffs, 
CASE N O ~ V  -400 1 -C 
d 2 7 5  - 7 7 3 7 2  
In this civil action, the parties tried the cause to a jury, which answered questions 
vs. 
DUSTIN M. KUKLA and DARRELL L. 
ROBERTSON, 
Defendants 
on a special verdict form on 18 July 2008 as follows. To Question I ,  addressing 
whether Darrell Robertson loaning a certain tractor and hay baler to Dennis Kukla 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
constituted negligence, the jury unanimously answered, "Yes." To Question 2, 
addressing whether the negligence found (in Question 1) on the part of Darrell 
Robertson constituted a proximate cause of the decedent's death and the injuries 
suffered by the Plaintiffs, eleven of twelve jurors answered, "No." To Question 3, 
addressing whether the negligence of Dustin Kukla amounted to a proximate cause of 
decedent's death and the injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs, eleven of twelve jurors 
answered, "Yes." To Question 4, addressing whether Darrell Robertson negligently 
entrusted Dustin Kukla with a tractor and baler, the jury unanimously answered, "No." 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-1 
Because of the negative answer to Question 4, the jury correctly skipped 
Question 5. To Question 6, addressing whether Dustin Kukla's operation of the tractor 
and baler in question on the highway at the time for the occurrence, happened with the 
express or implied permission of Darrell Robertson, the jury unanimously answered, 
"No." Due to the negative answer to Question 6, the jury correctly skipped Question 7 
With regard to Question 8, addressing whether Kenneth Tiegs (the decedent) 
negligently operated his vehicle at the time and place of the occurrence, nine of twelve 
jurors answered, "Yes." Notwithstanding the affirmative answer to Question 8, in 
Question 9, when asked whether Kenneth Tiegs' negligent operation of his vehicle 
constituted a proximate cause of his death, inexplicably, the jury unanimously 
answered, "No." What makes this answer so strange (notwithstanding defense 
counsel's erudite argument on how the jury's verdict does not amount to an inconsistent 
verdict) is found in the jury's answer to Question 10: the jury apportioned Kenneth 
Tiegs' fault at 5 %. 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs timely filed their motion for a new trial under three theories: 
IRCP 49(a), 49(b), and 59(a)(6). In opposing a new trial, Defendant Robertson argues 
that the jury throughout the process found that Robertson's negligence did not comprise 
a proximate cause of Kenneth Tiegs death or the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. 
Yet, as cogently pointed out by Plaintiffs' counsel in his Reply Memorandum, Robertson 
fails to address how the verdict could be anything but inconsistent, hence, against the 
law, in view of Instruction 20. 
The court certainly understands Defendant Robertson's attempt to produce a silk 
purse out of the sow's ear delivered by the jury last July. However, taking all of the 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-2 
"1 ~ 
evidence heard by this court, the same evidence heard by the jury, this court cannot 
conceive how the jury came to the conclusion it did with regard to appodioned fault on 
Defendant Robertson's behalf when they claim none of his actions proximately caused 
Kenneth Tiegs' death. Having said that, although the parties agreed to the form of the 
special verdict form used, it may have very well have led to what appears to be a 
confusion on the part of the jury when read with Instruction 20. 
Accordingly, this court finds and concludes the verdict delivered by the jury with 
regard to the answers given on proximate cause relating to Defendant Robertson's 
conduct amount to an inconsistency with their apportionment of damages. Henc 
pursuant to IRCP 49(b), the court finds the Plaintiffs are entitled to a new trial, unless 
the parties stipulate to judgment, as set out in paragraph 2, below. 
THEREFORE, THIS ORDERS THAT: 
1. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties as set out in paragraph 2, below, 
the court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' motion for new trial. 
2. If the parties agree to a judgment on the amount of $100,000.00 for non- 
economic damages, with an apportionment of 20% fault to Darrell Robertson and 80% 
fault to Dustin Kukla, equally divided amount the three Plaintiffs, they may present to the 
court a stipulated judgment conforming to the e no later than 15 December 2008. 
D A ~  this 20 Oco$20U$, 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-3 
The undersigned certifies that on October 2008 slhe served a true and correct copy of the original of 
the forgoing ORDER ON MOT! N FOR NEW TRIAL on the following individuals in the manner 
described: 
P- 
a Upon Eric S. Rossman and Chad M. Nicholson, ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC, attorneys for 
Plaintiffs, at 737 N. 7th Street, Boise, ldaho 83702; and upon 
Rodney R. Saetrum, SAETRUM LAW OFFICES, attorneys for Defendant Robertson, PO Box 
7425, Boise, Idaho 83707 
when slhe caused the same to be deposited into the US Mails, sufficient postage attached. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the Court 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL-4 
Rodney R. Saetmm ISBN: 292 1 
David Mr. Lloyd ISBN: 5501 
SMTRUM LAW OFFICES 
P.O. Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attomeys for Defendant Dare11 L. Robertson 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
7: CRAWFORD, DEPUW 
IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE THJRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
m W T H  TEGS and SONS, INC as 
subrogee of W G m  I N S W C E ,  
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV 04-4001 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 




TO: E S P O m E m S ,  a W T H  TEGS and SONS, LNC, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, 
ANI> TEE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT: 
1. Appellant, DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, appeals against Respondent to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFXNDANT ROBERTSON'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, entered in the above-entitled action on the 7* day 
of February, 2008, HONORABLE Gordon W. Petrie presiding. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, entered in the above-entitled action on 
the 20' day of October, 2008, HONORABLE Gordon W. Petrie presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the orders described 
in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l). 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
3. The preliminary statement of issues on appeal are: 
(1) Whether the District Court erred in its decision that motor vehicle 
statutory liability is imputed to f m  equipment. 
(2) Whether District Court erred in its decision to proceed with 
vague allegations of negligence as to Defendant Robertson. 
(3) Whether District Court erred in its decision to grant a new 
trial. 
4. Appellant does request the preparation of a reporter's standard transcript as 
defined in the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
Appellant requests the following transcripts: 
The transcript of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of 
March 8,2006. 
The transcript of the hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of 
January 3,2008. 
The transcript of the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial. 
5. Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the CLERK'S record in 
addition to those automatically included under Idaho Appellate Rules Rule 28: 
a. Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Stuntnary Judgment; 
b. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
c. Affidavit of Howell in Support of Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
d. Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
e. Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of law in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
f. Affidavit of Darrell L. Robertson 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
g. Affidavit of Michael A. Pope; 
h. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Mike Kukla's Motion for Summary 
Judpent;  
i. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary 
Judment; 
j. Affidavit of Erica Phillips in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment; and 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court as been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid 
(d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellant Rules Rule 20. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Attorneys for Darrell L. ~ o b J h o n  
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
I WEEBY CERTlFY that on this day of November 2008, I caused a true and LC 
correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to: 
Eric S. Rossrnan 
Erica S. Phillips 
J US. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC Overnight Mail 
737 N. 7th Street Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83702 
Terrence R. Wfu te 
WHITE PETERSON 
5700 East Franklin Road 
Suite 200 





Jan P. Malmberg, P.C. 
PERRY, MALkiBERG & PERRY 
t/ U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
99 North Main Street Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 364 Facsimile 
Logan, Utah 84323-0364 
Dustin Kukla 
6601 W. Dickman Rd. 
Melba, Idaho 83641 




NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
Date: 1/27/2009 ~hire~dicial District Court - Canyon County 
kE2@ 
User: HEIDEMAN ggg*< 
Time: 09:35 AM --sw' ROA Report 
Page 1 of 6 Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petr~e 
Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dust~n Michael Kukla, etal. 




New Case Filed-Other Claims Bradly S. Ford 
Summons Issued (2) Bradly S. Ford 
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Prior Appearance Paid Bradly S. Ford 
by: Jan Malmberg Receipt number: 0127557 Dated: 7/25/2005 Amount: 
$82.00 (Check) 
Filing: I IA  - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than $1000 No Prior Bradly S. Ford 
Appearance Paid by: Saetrum, Rodney R (attorney for Robertson, Darrell) 
Receipt number: 013141 1 Dated: 8/16/2005 Amount: $52.00 (Check) 
Notice Of Appearance Bradly S. Ford 
Sheriffs Return served Bradly S. Ford 
Motion for disqualification Bradly S. Ford 
Order for disqualification judge ford Bradly S. Ford 
Change Assigned Judge James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Order of Assignment James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Def Darrell Robertsons Answer & demand for JT (fax James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Order Setting Case and Scheduling Order James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 12/06/2005 09:OO AM) 1 Day Court Trial James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 1 1/04/2005 02:OO PM) James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Sheriffs Return 9-8-05 James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 1 1/03/2005 09:30 AM) to stay James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
proceedings 
Motion to stay proceedings James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Notice Of Hearing 1 1/03/2005 James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Defendnat Darrell Robertson's Pretrial conference statement (fax) James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/03/2005 09:30 AM: Hearing James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Held to stay proceedings 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 12/06/2005 09:OO AM: Hearing James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Vacated 1 Day Court Trial 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 11/04/2005 02:OO PM: Hearing James A. (J.R.) Schiller 
Vacated 
Change Assigned Judge 
Consolidation Of Files w/CV2004-4001 *C 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/02/2006 1 1 :30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 0411 812006 09:OO AM) 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/01/2005 09:OO AM) Summary Renae J. Hoff 
Judgment 
Order consolidating canyon county case numbers CV04-4001 and Renae J. Hoff 
CVO5-7739 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/01/2005 09:OO AM: Interim Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Held motion to continue summ jmt granted 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/05/2006 09:OO AM) summary Renae J. Hoff 
judgment IP00461 
Date 1/27/2009 ~hir$s?$icial District Court - Canyon County ",@- User: HEIDEMAN 
Time: 09.35 AM *y$3 k$? ROA Report L4 
Page 2 of 6 Case: 6V-2005-0007739-C Current Judge. Gordon W Petr~e 
Kenneth T~egs And Sons vs. Dust~n M~chael Kukla, etal. 
Kenneth T~egs And Sons vs, Dustin M~chael Kukla, Darrell Robertson 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/05/2006 09:OO AM: Motion Renae J. Hoff 
Held summary judgment 
Motion Granted - motion to continue Renae J. Hoff 
Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Gordon W Petrie 
Summary Judgment 
Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment Gordon W Petrie 
Affidavit of Darrel L. Robertson Gordon W Petrie 
Affidavit of Michael A. Pope Gordon W Petrie 
Notice Of Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/08/2006 01 :30 PM) summary Renae J. Hoff 
judgment 
Notice Of Service Gordon W Petrie 
Notice Of Service Gordon W Petrie 
Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Gordon W Petrie 
Summary Judgment 
Order resetting pre-trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/08/2006 03:OO PM) summary 
judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/08/2006 03:OO PM) 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/08/2006 03:OO PM: Motion 
Held summary judgment 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/08/2006 03:OO PM: Motion 
Denied summary judgment 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 03/08/2006 03:OO PM: Pre-Trial in 
Chambers 
Plaintiff Kenneth Tiegs & Son's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/17/2006 01 :30 PM) 
Pretrial Conference Order and notice of hearing 4-17-06 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Stephen Thornburgh, D.O. 
Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of David A. Martin, M.D. 
Notice Of Service 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Gordon W Petrie 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Renae J. Hoff 
offer of judgment (fax) Renae J. Hoff 
Defendants Robertsons Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate and Reset Renae J. Hoff 
Trial (fax) 
Interim Hearing Held - motion to continue jury trial granted Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 0411 812006 09:OO AM: Hearing Renae J. Hoff 
Vacated 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/17/2006 01 :30 PM: Renae J. Hoff 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 06/01/2006 09:OO AM) Renae J. Hoff 
Hearina result for Conference - Status held on 06/01/2006 09:OO AM: Renae J. Hoff 
~ea r i ng  Vacated 
Date: 112712009 Thir6gdicial District Court - Canyon Caunty &ii@.. 
L*:T 
User: HEIDEMAN 
Time: 09:35 AM *s*-v.- eLsi ROA Report ~ e s ~ ~  *a* 
Page 3 of 6 Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petrie 
Kenneth Tlegs And Sons vs. Dustin M~chael Kukla, etal. 
Kenneth Tlegs And Sons vs Dust~n Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson 
Other Claims 
Judge Date 
Notice Of Hearing for scheduling conference 8-16-06 11 :30 Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Gordon W Petrie 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. Hoff 
Renae J. HoR 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/16/2006 11:30 AM) 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum of Fred Rice 
Amended Notice Of Hearing 8-30-06 230  
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/30/2006 02:30 PM) 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 0813012006 02:30 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 09/08/2006 10:30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 01/04/2007 01 :30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 0911 012007 10:OO AM) 
Renae J. Hoff 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/25/2007 09:30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/05/2007 09:OO AM) mo allow 
additional expert Discovery 
Def Robertsons Opposition to Plt mo to allow additional expert Discovery 
(fax 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/05/2007 09:OO AM: Motion 
Held mo allow additional expert Discovery 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/21/2007 09:30 AM) Jury selection Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Defendant Robertson's Motion in limine Re: proposed expert testimony 
Affidavit of David Lloyd 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/06/2007 09:OO AM) 
Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of law in support of motion in limine 
Re: proposed expert testimony 
Notice of depostion duces tecum of Fred Rice Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Defendant Robertson's Pre-trial Memorandum 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/06/2007 09:OO AM: Motion 
Held - Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion in Limine 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/06/2007 09:OO AM: Motion 
Denied - Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion in Limine 
Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 0911 012007 10:OO AM: Hearing Held Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Gordon W Petrie 
Plaintiff Unigard Insurance Pre-trial Memorandum 
Defendant Robertson's Proposed Jury Instructions 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/14/2007 02:OO PM) 
Motion for protective order 
Affidavit of David W. Lloyd in support of motion for protective order 
Ex-Parte Motn for order to shorten time 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/14/2007 02:OO PM: Hearing 
Vacated - by Yvonne at Lloyd's office 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Walter J. Kosmatka (fax) 
000463 
Gordon W Petrie 
Date: 1/27/2009 Th i rgd ic ia l  District Court - Canyon County &@J% User: HEIDEMAN 
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Page 4 of 6 Case: CV-2005-0007739-6 Current Judge: Gordon W Petr~e 
Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dustln M~chael Kukla, etal. 
Kenneth Tlegs And Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
Def Roberson's Motion in Limine RE: Plt Sept. 18, 2007 discovery discloser Gordon W Petrie 
and amended trial Exhibit List 
Affidavit of David W. Lloyd Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/21/2007 0930 AM: Interim Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Held (Jury selection) 
Opening Comments and Voir Dire Gordon W Petrie 
Preliminary Instructions Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 09/25/2007 09:30 AM: Jury Trial Gordon W Petrie 
Started 
Mistrial Declared Gordon W Petrie 
Def Robertson's Memorandum of law in support of motn for sum judg on Gordon W Petrie 
Plt allegations of negligent entrustment negligence per se and imputed 
liability 
Notice Of Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/03/2008 09:OO AM) Motn for sum Gordon W Petrie 
judg 
Affidavit of Darrell L Robertson Gordon W Petrie 
Affidavit of David W Lloyd Gordon W Petrie 
Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion Gordon W Petrie 
for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Allegations of Negligent Entrustment, 
Negligence Per Se and Imputed Liability 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 01/03/2008 09:OO AM: Motion Gordon W Petrie 
Held Motn for sum judg (UNDER ADVISEMENT) 
Transcript Filed (September 25, 2007) Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/24/2008 09:30 AM) 5 day Gordon W Petrie 
Memorandum Decision On Def Robertsons mo for sum Judgment Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Telephone 02/26/2008 1 1 :00 AM) Gordon W Petrie 
telephonic scheduling conference 
Notice Of Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Conference - Telephone held on 02/26/2008 11 :00 AM: Gordon W Petrie 
lnterim Hearing Held telephonic scheduling conference 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/24/2008 09:30 AM: Continued 5 Gordon W Petrie 
day 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/14/2008 09:30 AM) 5 days Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 0611 612008 10:30 AM) Gordon W Petrie 
Order from Scheduling Conference Setting Status Conference and Jury Gordon W Petrie 
Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 07/02/2008 02:30 PM) mo exclude or Gordon W Petrie 
limit testimony 
Notice Of Hearing 7-2-08 2:30 Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 06/16/2008 10:30 AM: Gordon W Petrie 
Interim Hearing Held 
Date: 1/27/2009 ihir&<@icial District Court - Canyon County && User: WEIDEMAN 
c4 
Time: 09:35 AM *sz$w ROA Report ~w 
Page 5 of 6 Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petrie 
Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dustin M~chael Kukla, etal. 
Kenneth T~egs And Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
District Court Hearing Held Gordon W Petrie 
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Affidavit of David W Lloyd Gordon W Petrie 
Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motions in Gordon W Petrie 
Limine Re: Admissions of Co-Defendant's Conviction for Vehicular 
Manslaughter and Judical Estoppel of Plaintiff's Proposed Testimony, or in 
the Alternative, Admission of Plaintiffs' Previous Assertions Regarding 
Co-Defendant 
Defendant Robertson's Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, Gordon W Petrie 
Motion for Clarification of the Court's Summary Judgment Ruling Re 
Negligent Entrustment 
Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support Motion for Gordon W Petrie 
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, Motion for Clarification of the Court's 
Summary Judgment Ruling Re: Negligent Entrustment 
Defendant Robertson's Motion in Limine Re: Proposed Expert Testimony of Gordon W Petrie 
Walter J. Kosmatka 
Defendant Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion in Limine Gordon W Petrie 
Re: Proposed Expert Testimony of Walter J Kosmatka 
Affidavit of Mark Erickson Gordon W Petrie 
Affidavit of David W Lloyd Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 07/02/2008 02:30 PM: Motion Gordon W Petrie 
Held mo exclude or limit testimony 
District Court Hearing Held Gordon W Petrie 
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Defendant Robertson's Pre-trial Memorandum Gordon W Petrie 
Defendants Robertson's Proposed Jury Instructions Gordon W Petrie 
Order on Various Motions by Defendant Robertson Gordon W Petrie 
Interim Hearing Held - Motion to allow telephonic testimony Gordon W Petrie 
District Court Hearing Held Gordon W Petrie 
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: Jury Trial Gordon W Petrie 
Started 5 days 
Opening Comments to the Jury Gordon W Petrie 
Opening Jury Instructions Gordon W Petrie 
Preliminary Instructions Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: DAY TWO Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: Interim Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Held - DAY 3 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 09:30 AM: lnterim Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Held - DAY 4 
Date: 1/27/2009 ~ h i r g z  icial District Court - Canyon County -Y User: HEIDEMAN x"2: 
%s&* Time: 09 35 AM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 6 Case: CV-2005-0007739-C Current Judge: Gordon W Petr~e 
Kenneth Tiegs And Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, etal. 
Kenneth T~egs And Sons vs. Dustin Michael Kukla, Darrell Robertson 
Other Claims 
Date Judge 
711 812008 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/14/2008 0930 AM: Interim Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Held - DAY 5 
District Court Hearing Held (5 day trial) Gordon W Petrie 
Court Reporter: Yvonne Wyde-Gier 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: more than 500 
pages 
Instructions to the Jury (Final) Gordon W Petrie 
Special Verdict Form Gordon W Petrie 
Questions by Jury (3) Gordon W Petrie 
Post Verdict Instruction Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 0911 512008 10:OO AM) New Trial Gordon W Petrie 
Amended Notice of Hearing Gordon W Petrie 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 0911 512008 10:OO AM: Motion Gordon W Petrie 
Held New Trial (Under Advisement) 
District Court Hearing Held Gordon W Petrie 
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde-Gier 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
1012012008 Order on Motion for New Trial Gordon W Petrie 
CANYON COUNW CLERK 
C LINDHOLM. DEPUTY 
J a n  P. Malmberg, P.C. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
9 9  North Main S t r e e t  
P o s t  O f f i c e  Box 364 
Logan,Utah 84323-0364 
Phane/Fax 435-753-5331 
Bar Number: 7127 
E-mail: 
@mcleodusa.n 
JUDICIXL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR CANYON COqNTY - STATE OF IDAHO 
KENNETH TIEGS and SONS, I N C .  a s  
subrogee  of  U N I G A R D  INSURANCE 
P l a i n t i f f ,  
COMPLAINT 
DUSTIN KUKLA and DARRELL C i v i l  No. 
ROBERTSON Judge : 
Defendant .  
COMES NOW t h e  P l a i n t i f f ,  Kenneth T i e g s  and Sons,  I n c . ,  
a s  subrogee  o f  Unigard I n s u r a n c e  by and t h r o u g h  c o u n s e l ,  
J a n  P. Malmberg, and f o r  c a u s e  o f  a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  
Defendants ,  Dus t in  Kukla and D a r r e l l  Rober tson,  a l l e g e  and 
compla in  a s  f o l l o w s :  
Complaint, p. 1 
I. NATURE OF ACTION 
1. T h i s  i s  a s u b r o g a t i o n  a c t i o n  where in  Unigard  
I n s u r a n c e  i s  s t e p p i n g  i n t o  the s h o e s  o f  i t s  
i n s u r e d ,  Kenneth T i e g s  & Sons, i n  o r d e r  t o  p u r s u e  
t h i s  subroga  
11. 
was a n  i n d i v i d u a l  and a r e s i d e n t  of  Melba, Canyon 
County, Idaho.  
3. A t  a l l  t i m e s  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  a c t i o n  D a r r e l l  
Rober tson was an  i n d i v i d u a l  and r e s i d e n t  o f  Kuna, 
Ada County, Idaho.  
4 .  D u s t i n  Kukla was i n v o l v e d  i n  a  t r a c t o r / a u t o m o b i l e  
a c c i d e n t  w i t h  Kenneth T i e g s  i n  Canyon County, 
Idaho.  D u s t i n  Kukla was d r i v i n g  machinery  owned 
by d e f e n d a n t  D a r r e l l  Rober tson.  
Unigard I n s u r a n c e  i s  a company d o i n g  b u s i n e s s  i n  
Idaho who i n s u r e d  Kenneth T i e g s  and Sons, I n c .  
J u r i s d i c t i o n  and venue a r e  p r o p e r  i n  t h i s  C o u r t .  
Complaint, p.2 
I .  FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE 
7 .  P l a i n t i f f s  i n c o r p o r a t e  by r e f e r e n c e  a l l e g a t i o n s  1 
t h r o u g h  6 above.  
8. On J u l y  30, 2003, Kenneth D.  T i e g s ,  was d r i v i n g  a  
v e h i c l e  owned by Kenneth T i e g s  and Sons,  I n c .  
when it  s t r u c k  t h e  r e a r  o f  a t r a c t o r  w i t h  t r a i l e r  
b e i n g  d r i v e n  by Dus t in  Kukla and owned by D a r r e l l  
Rober tson.  
9. The t r a c t o r  w i t h  t r a i l e r  had no t a i l  l i g h t s  o r  
p i l o t  v e h i c l e  and was t r a v e l i n g  a t  a  r educed  
speed  i n  a  65 m.p.h. t r a v e l  zone. 
10 .  I n  c a u s i n g  t h e  s u b j e c t  c o l l i s i o n ,  D u s t i n  Kukla 
f a i l e d  t o  t r a v e l  s a f e t y  on t h e  roadway w i t h  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  t a i l s  l i g h t s  o r  p i l o t  v e h i c l e .  
11. I n  c a u s i n g  t h e  s u b j e c t  c o l l i s i o n ,  D a r r e l l  
Rober tson,  owner t h e  t r a c t o r  and t r a i l e r  
f a i l e d  t o  make t h e  t r a c t o r  w i t h  t r a i l e r  s a f e  f o r  
d r i v i n g  a t  n i g h t  t ime .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  he f a i l e d  
t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  v e h i c l e s  w i t h  p r o p e r  t a i l  l i g h t s  
o r  p i l o t  v e h i c l e .  
Complaint, p. 3 
12. In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla 
failed to keep a proper lookout for traffic 
approaching from the rear when he was driving 
without a pilot vehicle and without tail lights 
to notify traffic traveling on said road of the 
vehicles' locati 
13. In 
failed to operate the vehicles in a safe and 
reasonable fashion. 
14. In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla 
failed to operate the vehicles with reasonable 
care, particularly under the circumstances. 
15. In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla 
was operating his vehicles at a slow moving 
speed, which was hazardous under the 
circumstances. 
16. In causing the subject collision, Dustin Kukla 
and Darrell Robertson failed to follow the rules 
of the road and controlling traffic laws. 
Complaint, p. 4 
3.7. The  n e g l i g e n c e  o f  D u s t i n  Kukla  a n d  Darre l l  
R o b e r t s o n  was t h e  d i r e c t ,  p r o x i m a t e  a n d  s o l e  
c a u s e  of t h e  c o l l i s i o n  i n v o l v i n g  K e n n e t h  T i e g s  
a n d  D u s t i n  K u k l a .  
1 8 .  As a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  n e g l i g e n c e  o f  D u s t i n  K u k l a  a n d  
D a r r e l l  R o b e r t s o n ,  K e n n e t h  T i e g s  d i e d .  
1 9 .  As a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  n e g l i g e n c e  o f  D u s t i n  K u k l a  a n d  
Darre l l  R o b e r t s o n ,  U n i g a r d  p a i d  K e n n e t h  T i e g s  & 
S o n s ,  I n c .  b e n e f i t s .  
111. SUBROGATION 
2 0 .  P l a i n t i f f s  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e i r  a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  1 
t h r o u g h  1 9  h e r e i n .  
2 1 .  A t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  a b o v e - d e s c r i b e d  n e g l i g e n c e ,  
K e n n e t h  T i e g s  & S o n s ,  I n c .  was i n s u r e d  u n d e r  a  
c o n t r a c t  o f  i n s u r a n c e  w i t h  U n i g a r d  I n s u r a n c e .  
2 2 .  U n i g a r d  I n s u r a n c e ,  a s  t h e  i n s u r e r  o f  K e n n e t h  
T i e g s  & S o n s ,  I n c . ,  p a i d  o n  b e h a l f  o f  K e n n e t h  
T i e g s  & S o n s ,  I n c .  $ 5 , 0 0 0  a s  b e n e f i t  a r i s i n g  o u t  
o f  t h e  a c c i d e n t .  
Complaint, p. 5 
This payment was necessitated by the negligence 
of defendants. 
23. Unigard attempted to resolve this subrogation 
issue prior to filing suit; however, defendants 
simply ignored all attempts to resolve. 
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Kenneth Tiegs & Sons, Inc. as subrogee 
of Unigard Insurance prays for Judgment against defendants 
as follows: 
1. For the principal sum of no less than $5,000. 
2. For the highest amount of pre-judgment and post- 
judgment interest thereon allowed by law. 
3. For all costs associated in pursuit of this 
this action. 
5. For such further and additional relief as may 
seem appropriate and just to this Honorable 
Court. 
Complaint, p. 6 
, 7 /-- 
DATED this & -Me day of July, 2005. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Plaintiff's address : 
c/o Afni 
P. 0. Box 3068 
Bloomington, IL 61702 
Complaint, p. 7 
DATED this 17 day of July, 2005. 
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY 
Plaintiff's address: 
c/o Afni 
P. 0. Box 3068 
Bloomington, IL 61702 
Complaint, p. 7 
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Rodney R, Saemrn ISBN: 2921 
David W. Lloyd ISBN: 5501 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
300 E. Mallad Drive, Suite 370 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 336-0484 
Attorneys for Defendant Darrell L. Robertson 
SAETRLTH LAW OFFICES 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
1N THE IDISI'MCT COURT OF THE 2'JZB.D JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
I 








I KENNETH TIECS and SONS, ING as 
! sobrogee of UNIGMD INSURANCE, 
1 
D E r n r n r n  D A r n L L  
ROBERTSON'S ANSWER 
AND D ~ A ~  FOR JURY 
TIRXAIL, 
Case No. CV 05-7739 
Defendants. 
i 
I Defendant, Darrell L. Robertson, as and for an Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, pleads 
I 
and alleges as follows; 
P1aintif"fs Complaint, and each and every allegation, contained therein, fails to state a 
claim against Defendant upon which relief can be panted. 
DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWR AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
1 
0 8 / 3 0 1 2 0 0 5  18: 25 FAX 2 0 8  3 3 8  $g 
I 
SAETRUM L A W  OFFICES 
gz*,3> gg4 
I 
t e*$*q *&A **,*&, - 
Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's Complaint, unless 
expressly and specificdily hereinafter admitted. 
X I .  
With regard to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Phintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits the 
allegations contained therein, 
111. 
With regard to paragraphs 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits upo 
information and belief that Defendant Kukla was operating a tractor and baler owned by 
Defendant Robertson which was involved in an accident with a vehicle being operated by 
Kenneth D. Tiegs. With regards to the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 4 
of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant is without &formation sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of the allegations contained therein, and, therefore, denies the same. 
XV. 
With regard to paragraphs 5 and 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant admits the 
allegations contained therein. 
With regard to paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defeoda~t incorporates by reference 
paragraphs I. to IV. of this Answer as if hlIy set out herein. 
DEFENDANT DARRELL. ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 
SAETRLM LAW OFFICES 
&S&* 
;&%*g b ~ d  
VI. 
With regad to paragraph 8 of 1PXain.nriffs Complaint, Defendant admits upon idomation 
and belief chat on July 30, 2004, Keme& D. Tiegs was driving a vehicle: which struck the rear 
of the baler attached to a tractor operated by Defendant Dustin KukIa and owned by Defendant 
Darrcll Robertson. With regards to the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 8 
of PIaintiffs Compl&t, Defendant is without infomation mfficient to f o m  a belief as to the 
I truth of the allegations contained therein, d therefore, denies the same. 
1 With regard to paragraphs 9 through 19 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies each 
and every allegation contained therein. 
With regard to paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant incorporates by 
reference paragraphs I. through VII. of this Answer as if fully set out herein. 
I With regard to paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 of PlaintifPs Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information suficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations contained 
therein, and, therefore denies the same. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
I3ecdent was guilty of contributory/comparative negligence, which negligence 
proximately contributed to his injuries and damages, if any, and the negligence of said Decedent 
! 
I DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3 
SUTRZIIII LAW OFFICES 
was at least equal to, or @eater in degree, than any negligence on part of JSefen&nt. fn 
asserring this delFense, Defendant does not admit any negligen~e on his behalf, but, to the 
contrary, specifically denies all allegations of negligence. 
Raintiffs injufies and damges, if any, were caused by t41e supersedhg, iutervening acts 
andlor negligence of third persons not parties to this action. 
Pl&tiFs injuries and damages, if any, were caused by the supersed 
andlor conduct of Defendant Kukla andlow third persons who are not parti 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, which negligence was the sole and 
proximate cause of said Plaintiff's injuries and damages, if any. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
P l ~ t i f f  has faded to mjtigate its dmages, if any. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Decedent was guilty of negligent and careless misconduct which 
miscondu~t proximately caused andlor contxibu&& to Plaintiffs injuries 
NINTH DEFENSE 
The Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claims alleged in the 
Complaint. 
DEFENDANT D A W L L  ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TR.IAL - 4 
SAETRUI LAY OFFICES ooe 
Decedent's injjuries and damages, if any, were caused solely by the negligence of 
IDedent. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
Proper venue fox Ebjs case is in Ada County due to Defendant Robertson residing in said 
County. 
WWFOW, Defendant, prays fox judgment as foflows; 
1.  R ~ t i F r s  Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that PI 
nothing ther 
2. For Defendant's costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable attorney fees 
j under Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121; and 
1 
3. Fox such other and M e x  rd id  as the Court deems just and proper in the I 
premises. 
DATED this 30th day of August 2005. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defeadant hereby demands a jury trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38. 
DEENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5 
DATED this 30th day of August 2005, 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
Atlorneys fdr Darrell L. Robertson 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of August 2005, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing documant to be served by the method ind low and addressed to: 
Eric S, Rossman U.S, Mail 
Erica S. PbilIips 
ROSSMAN LAW GROUP, PLLC 
737 N.  7th Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Terrence R. 'White U.S. Mail 
WHITE PETERSON 
5700 &st F r d i n  Road 
Suite 200 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Jan P. Malmberg, P. C. U.S. Mail 
P ~ ~ Y ,  MALMBERC & PERRY 
99 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 364 
Logan, Utah 84323-0364 
/ 
DEFENDANT DARRELL ROBERTSON'S ANSWER AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6 
IN THE DTSTNCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICmL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
BRUCE TIEGS, etal., 1 
1 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 1 Case No. CV-04-040oi*C 
1 CV-05-07739"c 
-vs- 1 
1 CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 


















DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, 1 
1 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following 
are being sent as exhibits as requested in the Notice of Appeal: 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Michael Kukla's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Lodged 11-3-05 
GKRTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
- ------*-a, L+&*"&N~ 9- 
In the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho 
BRUCE TIECS. individually and as co- 
personal representative of the Estate of 
Kenneth Tiegs; STEVEN TIEGS; and 
SUSAN HUTER, individually and as co- 
personal representative of the Estate of 
Kenneth Tiegs, and K.P. INC., an Idaho 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
) TO AUGMENT EXHIBITS AND 
) REPORTER'S TRANSCNPT 
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, ) Supreme Court Docket No. 35921-2008 
) Canyon County District Court Nos. 
Defendant-Appellant, ) 2004-4001/2005-7739 
DUSTIN M. KUKLA, 
........................................................ 
KENNETH TIEGS AND SONS, INC., as 
subrogee of UNIGARD INSURANCE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
DUSTIN M. KUKLA, 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT EXHIBITS AND REPORTER'S TRAhTSCRIPT with 
attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant on February 8, 2010. The Court is fully advised; 
therefore, good cause appearing, 
t 
4 a I 
I 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED and the District Court Reporter shall prepare and lodge the transcript listed below with 
t h ~ s  Court witfun twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order and the District Court Clerk shall 
immediately serve counsel and file the transcript with this Court. Any corrections shall be filed 
with this Court as provided by I.A.R. 30.1 : 
1.  Transcript of the portions of the trial held on July 14-1 8, 2008, wherein the parties and 
the District Court discussed the following: 
a. jury instructions; 
i 
b. special verdict form; and 
c. Motion to Dismiss made by Appellant ,at the end of Respondent's case and the 
proceedings thereon. 
(Court Reporter Yvonne Hyde-Gier) (estimate d length of pages: 20) 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the augmentation record shall include the documents 
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied &s Motion: 
I 
1. Final Jury Instructions, file stamped July 18, 2008; and 
2. Special Verdict Form, file stamped July 18, 2008. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that proceedings in this appeal are SUSPENDED until the 
requested portions of the transcript listed above are filed with this Court. 
DATED this 9 day of March 20 10. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
Court Reporter Yvonne Hyde-Gier 
A+ 
I h  I l l  
~ 
ibit C From: d a ~ t  of John M. Howell in Support of Defendant 
Michael Kdda's Motion for Summary Judgment, Filed 11-3-05 
(Confidentid Under Seal) 
Dckfendmt Robertson's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judmerrt, Lodged 2-8-06 
Memormdum in Opposition to Defendant Mike KukJa's Motion kbr 
Summary Judgment, Lodged 2-23-06 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Darrell Robertson's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Lodged 2-23-06 
Defendant Robertson's Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Lodged 3-1-06 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this day of ,2009. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIJXI JUDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
BRUCE TIEGS, etal., 
Plairitiffs-Responden-ts, 
-17s- 
DUSTIN M. KUKLA, 
Defendant. 
and 
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
1 
1 Case No. CV-04-o4ooi*C 
1 CV -05-07739°C 
1 















DUSTIN M. K U U ,  
Defendant, 
and 
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I, WILLTAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including specific documents as requested, however 
there are no duplicate documents in case number CV-og-07739"C. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
?. 
i /\ 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this day of 1 1 ' c k L i  C ih -? 2009. 
WILLTAM H. IIURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIFZD JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
BRUCE TIEGS, etal., 1 
Plaintiffs- Respondents, 
-vs- 
DUSTIN M. KUKIA, 
Defendant. 
and 
DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
1 
1 Supreme court NO. 35921 
1 
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 










DARRELL L. ROBERTSON, 1 
1 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
I, WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Report:er's Transcript to the aaorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Rodney R. Saetrum and David W. Lloyd, SmTRUM LAW OFFICES, 
P.O. Box 7425, Boise, Idaho 83707 
Eric S. Rossman and Chad M. Nicholson, R O S S W  LAW GROUP, PLLC, 
737 N. 7th Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
P i; ' 
1 I#,# * i the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this b day of / 1-3 ! , i ,2009. 
WILLIAM H. HURST, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
